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Brazil is a large country with a very strong agricultural resource base. It is one of the world’s largest exporters 
of agricultural, forestry, and fishery products, trailing only the European Union and the United States in agricul-
tural export value. Brazil utilizes less than half of its arable land for farming. Yet until very recently, Brazil’s milk 
production had fallen short of domestic consumption, resulting in large net imports of dairy products. This is in 
contrast to Brazil’s neighbors, Uruguay and Argentina, which have traditionally been large net exporters of dairy 
products.
Recent growth in Brazilian milk production and exports suggests the possibility of a larger role for Brazil in 
world dairy markets. We evaluated conditions in the production sector, the processing sector and the government 
policy environment in an attempt to shed more light on this possibility.
Brazil is home to more than one million dairy farmers. A large majority of them have small herds of low- 
yielding dairy-beef cows and supply milk only to their families and the informal market. However, there is a pro-
gressive core of more than 100,000 dairy farmers who supply most of the milk processed by licensed processors. 
Brazil milk production costs are low compared to most developed countries, largely because most dairy farms 
employ some form of pasture-based production system. For farms that supplement grazing, sugarcane is an inex-
pensive source of green-chopped forage and citrus pulp is a readily-available energy feed. Animal health and dairy 
supply support services are adequate, but extension technical/management support is inconsistent and uncoordi-
nated.
Recent strong milk prices have spurred growth in milk production, encouraging investments in larger, modern 
dairy facilities and yield-enhancing genetic and technical improvements. If these incentives continue, we expect 
continued growth in milk production at an annual rate of about 4 percent.
Brazil’s dairy processing sector is undergoing major structural change. Concentration is increasing, accelerated 
by the recent entry of two large Brazilian meat packing companies into dairy. But there are still more than 1,100 
dairy processing plants in Brazil, most of which handle less than 10,000 liters per day—about the daily production 
of a well-managed 400-cow Wisconsin dairy farm. Most of these smaller processors are multi-service local coop-
eratives. 
Several Brazilian firms and major multi-national firms operating in Brazil have the experience and exporting 
networks needed to expand dairy exports, if warranted by profitability and if a sufficient supply of exportable sur-
plus milk is available. A significant constraint to expanded exports is Brazil’s strong currency, and it is unclear that 
the Brazilian real will weaken substantially against other currencies anytime soon. 
Government support for Brazilian agriculture in general and the dairy sector specifically is very low by devel-
oped country standards. Milk prices in Brazil were decontrolled in the early 1990s. Besides restrictions on sub-
sidized dairy imports and some purchases of dairy products for distribution to the poor, government assistance is 
largely limited to credit guarantees and subsidized interest rates for specified farm- and plant-level investments 
and for broader infrastructure development projects to improve transportation. But, while special interest rates are 
lower than commercial rates in Brazil, they are still high by U.S. standards, and infrastructure development does 
not seem to be proceeding at a rapid pace.
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With regard to trade policy, Brazil is a charter member of the Cairns Group, an aggressive free 
trade advocate in multilateral negotiations. Brazil has used the WTO dispute resolution mechanism 
effectively in challenging implicit export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support programs. 
Expanding exports by increasing market access is an unambiguous government objective.
Brazil’s future role as a dairy exporter will depend at least as much on internal demand as on 
supply. Brazil’s per capita milk consumption is less than one-half of the U.S. level. Despite culture-
related dietary preferences that have limited consumption of dairy products in the past, rising Brazil-
ian incomes will promote higher per capita usage. Plus, Brazil’s population will likely continue to 
grow at about a 1 percent annual rate. With more people consuming more dairy products, much of any 
increase in Brazil’s milk production will be needed to meet increasing domestic needs.
Nevertheless, our bottom line forecast is that growth in Brazilian milk production will outpace 
growth in domestic consumption. Dairy exports will continue to grow, probably to around four mil-
lion tons milk equivalent by 2015. This would significantly elevate its standing among leading dairy 
exporting countries.Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3  3
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The  Babcock  Institute  for  International  Dairy 
Research  and  Development  began  dairy  “Country 
Study” projects in 2004. These comprehensive studies 
summarize information relating to the competitiveness 
and likely future strategies of selected foreign dairy 
producers, processors, exporters and government agen-
cies. This information is intended to help U.S. firms 
and policymakers develop appropriate strategies and 
policies to exploit export opportunities and to accom-
modate the actions of foreign dairy companies and for-
eign governments in exporting countries. The studies 
are conducted by teams of University of Wisconsin-
Madison faculty and staff representing the fields of 
dairy production and management, dairy food process-
ing, dairy marketing and trade, and strategic behavior. 
As part of the studies, the teams visit the study coun-
tries to obtain first-hand insights from industry partici-
pants, government officials and others.
Previous  Babcock  country/regional  studies  and 
related  Babcock  Discussion  Papers  were:  Oceania 
(2004), Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2004-
3, The Dairy Sectors of New Zealand and Australia: 
A Regional Study; Poland (2005), Babcock Institute 
Discussion  Paper  No.  2005-3, The  Dairy  Sector  of 
Poland: A Country Study; India (2006), Babcock Insti-
tute Discussion Paper No. 2006-2, The Dairy Sector of 
India: A Country Study; and Ireland (2007), Babcock 
Institute Discussion Paper No. 2007-2, The Dairy Sec-
tor  of  Ireland: A  Country  Study. These  reports  can 
be downloaded from the Babcock Institute web site: 
http://babcock.cals.wisc.edu/publications/disc.lasso.
Brazil  was  selected  for  the  2008  country  study. 
Brazil is a major dairy country that has moved from 
being a significant importer to a net exporter of dairy 
products. International dairy analysts have identified 
Brazil as a country that could become an even larger 
dairy exporter in the relatively near future. However, 
these  same  analysts  have  noted  that  the  future  of 
Brazil’s dairy industry is among the most uncertain. 
This uncertainty has increased with the recent gov-
ernment incentives worldwide to produce crop-based 
transportation fuels. Brazil enjoys a large comparative 
advantage in producing sugar cane-based ethanol, and 
competition for land between growing feed and fuel 
will likely increase. This study takes a closer look at 
Brazil’s dairy industry in light of recent developments, 
with an eye to assessing its growth prospects and the 
implications of developments in Brazil’s dairy indus-
try for the U.S. and global dairy industries. 
Because of budget constraints, the Brazil dairy study 
team consisted of only two University of Wisconsin 
members: William D. Dobson is an emeritus professor 
in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Econom-
ics and an agribusiness economist with the Babcock 
Institute. Professor Dobson’s expertise is international 
agricultural  trade,  agribusiness  management,  and 
macroeconomics. Edward V. Jesse is a professor and 
Extension dairy marketing and policy specialist in the 
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics at 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison and director of 
trade and policy studies for the Babcock Institute. Pro-
fessor Jesse’s expertise is dairy farm management and 
dairy marketing and trade. The Brazilian member of 
the team was Ronaldo Braga Reis, a professor in the 
School of Veterinary Medicine, Federal University of 
Minas Gerais. Professor Reis’ expertise includes ani-
mal health maintenance and dairy herd management.
Following an extensive review of print materials 
and internet sites, the team conducted on-site inter-
views arranged by Professor Reis in June 2008. We 
interviewed  individuals  and  groups  representing  a 
broad spectrum of Brazil’s dairy sector, including dairy 
farmers, dairy processor executives, feed dealers, trade 
association leaders, government officials and academi-
cians.
Throughout our literature review and personal inter-
views, we focused on a central theme: the potential for 
Brazil to become a major player in international dairy 
markets. Specific related questions included:
•  What are likely trends in Brazil’s milk cow 
numbers and milk yield per cow? 
•  What will it require for milk production to 
favorably compete with beef, soybean and sugar 
cane production in Brazil?
•  Under what conditions will dairy farming 
increase in the cerrado and Amazon regions of 
Brazil?
•  How will the informal sector of Brazil’s dairy 
sector evolve? Will regulatory pressures and/or 
I. INTRODUCTIONThe Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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economic incentives lead to a larger proportion 
of milk being sold to commercial processors? 
•  What are likely trends in consumer demand for 
Brazil’s dairy products? How do anticipated 
overall increases in dairy product consumption 
compare with anticipated increases in milk 
production? Are any particular dairy products 
likely to witness big increases in consumption?
•  How have government policies impacted Brazil’s 
dairy sector and how are policies expected to 
change? 
•  Dairy processor concentration has increased 
in Brazil in recent decades. How will this 
development affect Brazil’s dairy exports? 
•  What are the objectives or strategies of the 
large foreign dairy firms (e.g., Nestle, Fonterra, 
Parmalat, etc.) that have invested in Brazil’s 
dairy sector in recent decades? To satisfy 
domestic demand? To obtain dairy products for 
export?
•  Which Brazilian dairy firms are most competitive 
in export markets?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
First, we describe Brazil’s geography and macroeco-
nomic environment, emphasizing the importance of 
agriculture. Next, we describe and evaluate Brazil’s 
dairy farming and dairy processing sectors. We then 
review  agricultural  and  trade  policy  developments 
affecting  Brazil’s  dairy  industry.  Finally,  we  sum-
marize our assessment of Brazil’s future as a dairy 
exporter,  and  related  implications  for  the  U.S.  and 
global dairy sectors. 
II. GEOGRAPHY, ECONOMY AND THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE
The distinctive characteristics of Brazil’s geography 
and growing economy will shape the future of many of 
the country’s industries, including the dairy industry. 
Therefore, it is useful to review information on Bra-
zil’s geography and macro-economy to provide back-
ground for later parts of this report. We also describe 
Brazil’s agricultural sector, focusing on the country’s 
substantial role in world agricultural trade.
Brazil’s Geography
Occupying 8.5 million square kilometers, Brazil is 
the largest country in South America. The country’s 
large size relative to three neighboring trading-partner 
countries in South America is shown in Table 1. Brazil 
is about seven-eighths as large as the U.S. 
In addition to the countries listed in Table 1, Brazil 
borders Bolivia, Colombia, French Guiana, Guyana, 
Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela (Figure 1). 
Brazil has 26 states and one federal district. Brasilia, 
the country’s capital, is located in the Federal District. 
The country’s terrain consists mainly of flatlands and 
rolling lowlands in the North. Much of the remainder 
of Brazil is of varied topography and consists of plains, 
hills, mountains and a narrow coastal belt. Brazil’s cli-
mate is mostly tropical but temperate in the South. 
Brazil has a high level of urbanization—8 of 10 
Brazilians live in cities [60]. The 10 largest cities in 
Brazil, location of the cities by state, and city popula-
tions appear in Table 2. The population density in the 
country is highest in the south and on the Atlantic Sea-
board where many of the 10 largest cities are located, 
and lowest in the west-central of the country. In the 
mid-2000s,  Brazil  had  100  cities  with  populations 
exceeding 250,000.
Brazil’s Economy
Brazil’s economy has improved substantially from 
the situation that existed two decades ago. But during 
the early and mid-2000s, Brazil was still a low per-
TABLE 1.   Geographic Area of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
and Paraguay
Country  Geographic Area (Sq. Km)  % of U.S. Area
Brazil  8,511,965  86.62
Argentina  2,766,890  28.16
Uruguay  176,220  1.79
Paraguay  406,750  4.14
Source: [8].Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3  5
The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
former  compared  to  other  members  of  the  rapidly-
developing group of countries commonly referred to 
as the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). For 
example, Brazil’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth rate from 2001 to 2006 was lower than that 
of Russia and only a fraction of the 6 to 10 percent 
GDP growth recorded in China and India during much 
of this period. Indeed, Brazil’s real GDP grew more 
slowly during 2001 to 2006 than many of its neigh-
bors in South America. Brazil’s poorer economic per-
formance in this period can be traced partly to low 
economic growth in certain geographical areas. For 
example,  the  economy  of  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Brazil’s 
second largest city, exhibited a zero growth rate from 
1975 to 2006. According to the Economist, growth 
enterprises there are thwarted by bureaucracy and high 
taxes [15, p. 30]. 
The positives for Brazil’s economy include an end to 
the hyperinflation of the early 1990s, higher growth of 
real GDP in 2007, a commodity-driven current account 
surplus for 2007, a budget surplus for 2007, and lower 
real  interest  rates  that  have  sparked  an  upsurge  in 
investment.  Interestingly,  Brazil’s  real  interest  rates 
in 2008 are forecast to be in the 7 to 8 percent range, 
which would be high enough to tip many economies 
into recession but are low by Brazilian standards [13].
Two pieces of good news emerged for Brazil’s econ-
omy in 2008. First, Standard & Poor’s raised the coun-
try’s longer-term sovereign credit rating from BB+ to 
BBB– (investment grade) in April 2008, an important 
acknowledgement of economic progress made in the 
country [44]. Fitch Ratings gave an identical upgrade 
to Brazil’s credit rating in May 2008, citing Brazil’s 
success in taming once-rampant inflation as part of the 
reason for the upgrade [1]. Among other things, the 
upgrades will lower Brazil’s borrowing costs in inter-
national credit markets. 
Second, Petrobras, Brazil’s state-controlled oil com-
pany, announced in April 2008 that it discovered a new 
oil deposit about 155 miles off the coast of São Paulo 
state [50]. The new field is close to Petrobras’ massive 
Tupi field and may represent a large untapped resource 
for Brazil. However, the amount of oil in the new field 
has not yet been determined.
Statistics  describing  Brazil’s  economic  situation 
appear in Table 3, together with figures for Argentina 
and the U.S. As noted later, the different economic sit-
uation facing Brazil relative to Argentina and the U.S. 
has  implications  for  the  country’s  milk  production, 
dairy product consumption, and dairy exporting. 
Most of the statistics in Table 3 are self-explanatory. 
Item 3 (2005 figure on percent of population below the 
poverty line) probably overstates the degree of pov-
erty. A different estimate suggests that the percentage 
of Brazil’s population with incomes below the poverty 
line may be as small as 23 percent [15, p. 30]. 
TABLE 2. The 10 Largest Cities in Brazil
Rank  City  State  Population, 2006
1  São Paulo  São Paulo  11,016,703
2  Rio de Janeiro  Rio de Janeiro  6,136,652
3  Salvador  Bahia  2,892,625
4  Belo Horizonte  Minas Gerais  2,424,295
5  Fortaleza  Ceara  2,416,920
6  Brasilia  Federal District  2,383,784
7  Curitiba  Parana  1,788,559
8  Manaus  Amazonas  1,644,690
9  Recife  Pernambuco  1,515,052
10  Porto Alegre  Rio Grande do Sul  1,440,939
Source: [60]. Population figures do not include estimates for the 
entire metropolitan areas associated with the cities listed.
FIGURE 1. Brazil’s and Bordering CountriesThe Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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Brazil’s real GDP totaled $1.838 trillion in 2007 
measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, 3.5 
times that of Argentina but only about one-eighth as 
large as that of the U.S. The per capita GDP figures 
expressed in PPP terms—which take into account dif-
ferences in the cost of living among countries—show 
that Brazil’s citizens have incomes about 75 percent 
as large as those for Argentina but only 21 percent as 
large as those for U.S. citizens. 
The implications of these income proxy figures for 
dairy  product  consumption  patterns  in  Brazil  must 
be interpreted cautiously. The low average incomes 
of Brazilians suggest that they would consume large 
quantities of dairy products with low-income elastici-
ties of demand, for example, milk powder. However, 
there are many higher income consumers with sub-
stantial purchasing power who presumably would con-
sume dairy products with high-income elasticities of 
demand, such as specialty cheeses and fluid milk prod-
ucts. Specifically, in 2004 the top 10 percent of Bra-
zilian households had about 45 percent of the income 
and the bottom 10 percent had less than 1 percent of 
income [8]. These income distribution figures suggest 
that there may be sizable markets in Brazil for dairy 
products with both low- and high-income elasticities 
of demand. 
However,  Brazil’s  consumer  preference  patterns 
make it difficult to draw unambiguous implications 
about dairy product demand. Brazilians consume dairy 
products mostly for breakfast and their other meals 
tend to be meat-based. In addition, dairy desserts are 
not big consumption items in Brazil. Thus, drawing 
conclusions about future consumption of dairy prod-
ucts in Brazil based on expected income growth and 
population  growth  is  more  difficult  than  for  many 
other countries. 
Brazil’s unemployment rate in 2007 was slightly 
higher than that of Argentina and approximately dou-
ble that of the U.S. The country’s literacy rate—while 
not abnormally low at 88.6 percent—masks problems 
with the country’s educational system. Many accounts 
suggest that Brazil’s educational system needs to be 
upgraded if the country is to sustain competitive rates 
of economic growth. 
While corruption in Brazil is less prevalent than in 
earlier decades, it is still high by U.S. standards. Cor-
ruption—which tends to be correlated strongly with 
levels of regulation and bureaucracy in many coun-
tries—probably is a significant impediment to strong 
TABLE 3. Selected Statistics for Brazil, Argentina, and the United States
Item  Brazil  Argentina  U.S 
1.   Population (July 2008)  191,908,598  40,677,348  303,824,646
2.   Population Growth Rate (%)  0.98  0.92  0.88
3.   Population Below Poverty Line (%)  31  23.4  12
4.   GDP (PPP in US$, Trillion)  1.838  0.524  13.86
5.   GDP Per Capita (PPP in US$)  9,700  13,000  46,000
6.   Real GDP Growth Rate (%)  4.5  8.5  2.2
7.   Fixed Investment (% of GDP)  17.9  22.0  15.6
8.   Unemployment Rate (%)  9.8  8.9  4.6
9.   Inflation Rate (%)  4.1  8.5  2.7
10. Literacy Rate (%)  88.6  97.2  99.0
11. Corruption Perceptions Index  3.5  2.9  7.2
*Sources: CIA World Factbook [8] for items 1–10. Item 11 was obtained from Transparency Inter-
national [56]. Items 1–2 represent 2008 figures. Items 4–9 and 11 represent 2007 figures. Item 3 
represents 2005, 2007, and 2004 figures for Brazil, Argentina, and the U.S., respectively. Item 10 rep-
resents figures for 2004, 2001 and 2003 for Brazil, Argentina, and the U.S., respectively. For Item 9, 
the CIA World Factbook reports that the 8.5 percent inflation rate for Argentina is the official rate, but 
that the actual rate may be double the official rate. Key for interpreting Corruption Perceptions Index: 
10 = highly clean, 1 = highly corrupt. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3  7
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economic  growth  in  Brazil.  High  levels  of  regula-
tion and bureaucracy are particularly discouraging to 
business entrepreneurship in Brazil. The International 
Finance  Corporation’s  “Doing  Business”  study  is 
instructive on this point, as noted below [14, p. 45]:
Starting a business (in Brazil) takes 152 days and 
requires 18 different procedures . . . It takes 2,600 
hours for a medium-size business to keep up with 
its taxes each year. The same hypothetical business 
would pay 69% of its second-year profits in tax, if it 
played by the rules and did not receive special tax 
breaks.
Given this environment for entrepreneurship, it not 
surprising  that  Brazil’s  entrepreneurs  show  a  will-
ingness to bend the law [14, p. 45]. This presumably 
makes many Brazilian entrepreneurs both victims of, 
and contributors to, corrupt practices.
An employee of a major international dairy equip-
ment  company  (interviewed  by  the  study  team  in 
Brazil) claimed that corruption has become less of a 
problem in Brazil, noting that, “There are people who 
can help businesses work around the problem of cor-
ruption.”
McKinsey  analysts  provide  additional  insights 
about Brazil’s economy, particularly those relating to 
labor productivity in agriculture, as follows [28, p. 3].
. . . Inadequate regulation and the informal economy 
will continue to sap productivity in Brazil. . . . by 
allowing subscale enterprises to compete alongside 
efficient ones. Despite the presence of large, well-
managed Brazilian players that control big shares 
of output and trade, the country’s agricultural labor 
productivity, for instance, is only 5 percent of that in 
the United States. The size of the labor productivity 
gap is directly related to the large number of agri-
cultural concerns dedicated to subsistence activi-
ties, often characterized by low capital utilization, 
suboptimal scale, and dismal efficiency levels.
Brazil’s Exchange Rate 
Changes  in  the  value  of  the  Brazilian  currency 
deserve special attention in discussing Brazilian eco-
nomic conditions and, especially, in evaluating export-
ing potential. 
Brazil has faced exchange rate problems in the past 
decade.  In  the  late  1990s,  foreign  investors  feared 
that the Brazilian real was overvalued. At the dollar-
pegged exchange rate employed in Brazil in the late 
1990s capital outflows accelerated, rapidly depleting 
government hard currency reserves and creating fears 
of a financial crisis much like the one that occurred in 
Russia in 1998 [34]. As a result of these developments, 
Brazil’s government on January 1, 1999 abandoned its 
dollar-peg and allowed the real to float.
After the dollar peg was eliminated, the real was 
weak and volatile during much of the time for about 
the next four years, reaching a low point of 3.93 reals 
to the U.S. dollar in late October 2002 (Figure 2). The 
real showed temporary strength after the U.S. reces-
sion in the early 2000s. But, beginning in 2003, the 
real begin to exhibit generally consistent strength. For 
the first four months of 2008, the real averaged about 
1.72 to the U.S. dollar. Thus, the Brazilian real went 
from being worth about US$0.25 at its low point in 
October 2002 to US$0.58 during the first four months 
of 2008, more than a two-fold increase. 
The strength of the real reflects improvements in 
Brazil’s  macroeconomic  policies  in  the  mid-2000s. 
These policies helped to increase Brazil’s exports, cre-
ated a current account surplus, and gave Brazil large 
foreign currency reserves. Brazil’s improved economic 
situation increased the demand for real-denominated 
assets and the strength of Brazil’s currency in foreign 
exchange markets. 
Will the real continue to be strong for the foresee-
able future? Exchange rates are, of course, difficult to 
predict. Thus, it is difficult to predict whether the mod-
est increases in the value of the U.S. dollar relative to 
the real in the autumn of 2008 foretells a more sub-
stantial weakening of the real. However, developments 
in place are likely to keep the real relatively strong. 
First, Brazilian real interest rates will remain high. In 
May, 2008 Brazil’s benchmark interest rate (similar 
to the U.S. federal funds rate) was 11.75 percent and 
a number of analysts forecasted that the benchmark 
rate would be raised to 13 to 14 percent by year end, 
partly to curtail inflation. If Brazil’s benchmark inter-
est rates increase as forecast, Brazil’s interest rates 
for 2008 will be 7 to 8 percentage points higher than 
inflation for the year. The 7 to 8 percent real interest 
rates are sharply higher than the very low or negative The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
8  Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3
real interest rates that will be realized on certain U.S. 
investments in 2008 if the federal funds rate remains at 
about 1 percent. 
Brazil faces the challenge of remaining competitive 
in export markets if the Brazilian real remains strong 
relative to the U.S. dollar. Brazil’s government appar-
ently would like to see a somewhat weaker real in 
order to enhance the competitiveness of the country’s 
exports, but there is little that Brazil’s central bank 
can do to slow the appreciation of the real against the 
U.S. dollar. The futility of trying was revealed when 
Brazil’s central bank lost billions of dollars in 2007 in 
unsuccessful efforts via currency market transactions 
to slow the appreciation of the real against the U.S. 
dollar [2]. Concerted action from a number of cen-
tral banks probably would be required to substantially 
strengthen the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies, 
including the real.
The  robust  economic  conditions  in  Brazil  that 
have accompanied the stronger real will likely foster 
expanded  domestic  consumption  of  dairy  products 
and, other things constant, tend to reduce exportable 
dairy surpluses. In addition, the strength of the real 
will almost certainly work to curtail the country’s dairy 
exports to some extent relative to U.S. dairy products 
in foreign markets. 
But recent developments tell a more nuanced story. 
Despite the growing strength of the real versus the 
U.S. dollar, Brazilian dairy exports rose to a record 
US$300 million in 2007 (see Section IV). High inter-
national prices for dairy products meant exports were 
profitable enough to allow Brazilian dairy exporters 
to bid dairy products away from firms selling in the 
domestic market. 
Land Resources 
McKinsey  analysts  describe  Brazil’s  farmland 
resources as a major positive factor that will enhance 
farming and agribusiness development in the country, 
as follows [28, p. 1]:
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. . . favorable weather and soil create an ideal envi-
ronment for crops and livestock. Brazil’s endow-
ment of arable land, for example, is a whopping 
4,100,000 square Kilometers—roughly the size of 
the European Union before the addition of Bulgaria 
and Romania—only 17 percent of it now in use. 
Indeed, Brazil could more than double its current 
utilization level without harming the country’s Ama-
zon rainforest. China, India, and the United States 
all have less farmland and much higher utilization 
rates.
While this description of Brazil’s arable land seems 
largely accurate, it may understate the possible dam-
age from agricultural development to Brazil’s Amazon 
rainforest. International and domestic concerns have 
been raised about how deforestation in the Amazon 
Basin is destroying habitat and endangering plant and 
animal species indigenous to the area [8]. 
The cerrado (Portuguese for “closed” or “inacces-
sible”) is a vast tropical savanna eco-region of Bra-
zil, which has undergone agricultural development in 
recent decades [59]. It consists of 1,916,900 square 
kilometers of territory—an area roughly the size of 
Alaska.  It  covers  the  Brazilian  states  of  Goias,  the 
Federal District, most of Mato Grasso, Mato Grosso 
do Sul, and Tocantins, the western portions of Minas 
Gerais and Bahia, the southern portions of Maranhao 
and Piaui, and small parts of three additional states.
Once thought to be of limited value for agriculture, 
the cerrado’s productivity was increased by research-
ers at Embrapa (Brazil’s Agricultural Research Cor-
poration), who discovered that the fertility of cerrado 
soils could be substantially enhanced by appropriate 
additions of phosphorus and lime. Embrapa research-
ers also developed tropical (lower latitude) soybean 
varieties that were productive in the region.
Presently, the cerrado accounts for about 70 percent 
of the beef cattle production in the country and, thanks 
to irrigation and soil fertility enhancement techniques, 
it has become an important production center for soy-
beans, corn, and rice. But agricultural development 
in  the  cerrado  involves  numerous  challenges.  The 
Economist’s Special Report on Brazilian Agriculture 
describes those challenges as follows [16, p. 75]:
Agriculture’s  march  to  the  cerrado  has  been  a 
march  away  from  consumers.  Despite  the  larger 
scale of farmers in the center-west, their break-even 
point is 12% higher than that of southern farms . . . 
due largely to higher transportation costs.
Goldsmith and Hirsch report similar findings in a 
2006 study, which showed that domestic freight costs 
for  marketing  soybeans  produced  in  Central  Bra-
zil were $0.51 (73 percent) per bushel higher than in 
southern Brazil. However, total production costs for 
soybeans in central Brazil were only about 9 percent 
higher than in southern Brazil.
The Economist’s Special Report on Agriculture attri-
butes Brazil’s higher agricultural transportation costs 
in the cerrado and elsewhere in the country partly to a 
shaky infrastructure [16, p. 75]:
Just 10% of the country’s roads are paved com-
pared with 29% in neighboring Argentina...Brazil 
has neglected its railways, a more sensible way than 
roads to transport grain. Its navigable rivers do not 
traverse the heart of the country like America’s Mis-
sissippi but veer off into the Amazon rainforest.
It is unclear how important the cerrado has become 
for dairy cattle production in Brazil. But clearly the 
grains  and  soybeans  now  produced  in  the  cerrrado 
could be important inputs for dairy cattle farming sys-
tems that use feed grains and soybeans as ration sup-
plements. 
Role of Agriculture in the Brazilian Economy
Agriculture is an enormous contributor to the Bra-
zilian economy, both in terms of domestic economic 
activity and export earnings. In 2007, livestock and 
crop  production  accounted  for  3.2  and  5.1  percent, 
respectively, of Brazil’s GDP (Table 4). 
The entire agribusiness complex has consistently 
contributed about a quarter of Brazil’s GDP. Real total 
GDP  grew  by  20  percent  between  1995  and  2007, 
while the real value of crop and livestock production 
grew by about 30 percent. This is evidence of histori-
cally high commodity prices in recent years. Despite 
Brazil’s focus on bulk agricultural exports, the contri-
bution of the agricultural processing and distribution 
sectors to GDP substantially outweighs that of the pro-
duction sector. The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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The 26 percent of total GDP accounted for by the 
entire Brazilian agribusiness sector in 2007 compares 
to 4.3 percent for U.S. agriculture and related indus-
tries in 2006 [20]. The 8.3 percent of total GDP con-
tributed by Brazilian production of livestock and crops 
compares to production agriculture’s 0.7 share of U.S. 
GDP. While  the  method  of  deriving  these  numbers 
may be different between Brazil and the U.S., agricul-
ture production, processing and distribution are clearly 
much more important to Brazil’s economy than to the 
economies of the United States and other highly-devel-
oped countries.
Brazilian agriculture is very diverse, reflecting the 
country’s  diverse  land  base  and  climate  (Table  5). 
Both tropical and temperate climate crops are grown 
on a large scale. Soybeans are the largest crop by farm 
value, followed by sugarcane, coffee, corn, rice and 
oranges (for frozen concentrate). Beef is the highest-
valued commodity in the livestock sector, but chicken 
and milk sales are growing at a faster rate than live-
stock sales.
Brazil is a leading world exporter of agricultural 
products, ranking behind only the European Union and 
the U.S. in 2005 [22]. In that year, Brazil ranked first 
in export value for the following major commodities 
in foreign agricultural trade: orange juice (56 percent 
of world exports), sugar (36 percent), poultry meat (28 
percent), coffee (25 percent), beef (19 percent) and 
TABLE 4. Contribution of Agriculture to Brazil’s GDP
                                  2007 
          % of   % of  
          Agribusiness   Total  
Sector  1995  2000  2005  Value  GDP  GDP 
                                 Million Reals
Nonfarm Inputs  22,215  29,275  36,842  40,527  6.1%  1.6%
Livestock Products  61,258  67,876  74,823  80,779  12.1%  3.2%
Crop Products  82,313  76,214  93,964  131,693  19.7%  5.1%
Processing  180,037  170,149  193,346  207,442  31.0%  8.1%
Distribution  168,452  170,647  193,967  209,326  31.3%  8.2%
Total Agribusiness GDP  514,275  514,161  592,943  669,768  100.0%
Total GDP  2,121,668  2,248,296  2,295,279  2,558,822
Agribusiness as Percent of Total  24.2%  22.9%  25.8%  26.2%
Values expressed in real (2007) terms.
Source: [6].
TABLE 5.   Farm Value of Brazilian Livestock and Crop 
Products
                            Farm Value of Production (Billion Reals) 
Products  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008*
Livestock:
Bovine meat  32.2  30.6  32.4  32.8  45.5
Chicken  16.4  16.5  17.2  21.8  23.8
Milk  11.9  12.6  13.0  15.0  19.6
Swine  6.4  6.8  6.3  7.3  8.5
Other Livestock  3.4  3.4  3.7  3.8  4.1
Total Livestock  70.3  70.0  72.6  80.8  101.5
Crops:
Soybeans  36.7  25.2  24.7  33.1  45.6
Sugar cane  12.5  13.4  19.3  21.4  18.1
Maize  13.8  10.2  11.7  19.2  28.6
Coffee  8.8  9.6  11.3  9.5  13.3
Rice  8.8  6.6  5.7  6.3  7.2
Oranges  3.0  3.1  4.5  5.2  5.3
Other Crops  34.2  30.4  30.4  37.0  43.4
Total Crops  117.9  98.6  107.6  131.7  161.6
Total Agriculture  188.2  168.5  180.2  212.5  263.1
*Projected
Source: [19].Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3  11
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tobacco (16 percent). Brazil was a close second to the 
U.S. in soybean exports, accounting for more than one-
third of total world export value. Brazil was among the 
top ten exporters of cotton, pork and corn.
Agricultural  exports  have  recently  represented 
between 35 and 40 percent of total Brazilian exports 
(Figure  3).  In  real  terms,  the  value  of  agricultural 
exports nearly tripled between 1999 and 2007. More 
important, Brazilian exports of agricultural products 
are several times imports, offsetting what is often a 
trade deficit for non-agricultural products (Figure 4).
The composition of agricultural exports in 2007 is 
shown in Figure 5. Soybeans, soybean products (soy-
bean meal and soybean oil) and meats accounted for 
39 percent of export value. Wood and forest products, 
sugar products (including sugarcane alcohol) and cof-
fee added another 33 percent. While totaling US$300 
million in 2007, exports of dairy products accounted 
for  only  0.5  percent  of  Brazil’s  US$54.8  billion  in 
agricultural exports. For comparison, total U.S. agri-
cultural exports in calendar year 2007 were US$90 bil-
lion and dairy exports were about US$3 billion.
Brazilian  agricultural  products  were  sold  in  219 
countries in 2007 (Figure 6). Since at least 1997, the 
United States has been the top overseas recipient of 
Brazilian  agricultural  goods.2  The  major  products 
imported by the United States from Brazil are coffee 
(US$700 million in 2007), frozen concentrated orange 
juice  (US$380  million),  beef  (US$330  million), 
tobacco (US$285 million), sugar (US$185 million), 
nuts and nut products3 (US$170 million), and cocoa 
(US$110 million).
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Source: [43]. 
2 The U.S. will likely lose its top spot to China in 2008. Through July, Brazilian exports to China were valued at US$5.5 billion compared to 
US$3.6 billion in sales to the United States.
3 It perhaps goes without saying that Brazil is also the largest world supplier of in-shell Brazil nuts, accounting for 72 percent of world 
exports in 2005. The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
12  Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3
























FIGURE 5.   Composition of Brazil Agricultural Exports, 
2007
Total Export Value: US$54.8 Billion
FIGURE 6. Destination of Brazil Agricultural Exports, 2007
Total Export Value: US$58.4 Billion                        Values in US$ Billion
Source: [43]. 
Source: [43].  Source: [30]. 
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Synopsis
Brazil is a potential agricultural powerhouse that 
is beginning to flex its muscles. Land resources have 
always been abundant and productive. What is dif-
ferent now is a much more favorable economic envi-
ronment both internally and externally. In particular, 
strong world prices for most of Brazil’s export com-
modities have engendered confidence among existing 
and new producers and encouraged expanded produc-
tion. Possible constraints to growth are the high value 
of the Brazilian real, environmental concerns poten-
tially leading to land use restrictions, and a poorly-
developed infrastructure that elevates marketing costs 
above export competitors. A rapidly growing economy 
could  also  elevate  wages  to  agricultural  workers, 
increasing production and marketing costs.
III. DAIRY PRODUCTION SECTOR
General Characteristics and Trends in Milk 
Production
Brazil produced about 27 million tons of cows’ milk 
in 2007 and, according to USDA’s Foreign Agricultural 
Service (FAS), is expected to produce 29 million tons 
in 2008 (Figure 7) [25].4 Production has about doubled 
since 1990. The annual rate of growth has averaged 
2.7 percent in this decade and has exceeded 4 percent 
since 2005.
After peaking at 18 million cows in 1993, Brazil’s 
dairy herd decreased to 15 million cows in 2005. FAS 
estimates 2008 Brazilian cow numbers at 16.7 million, 
an 11 percent increase in three years.
4 There are several, sometimes conflicting, sources of dairy production statistics for Brazil, including FAO, USDA- FAS, and the Brazilian 
government. We elected to use USDA statistics where there were differences, largely because changes in reporting definitions for official 
government statistics precluded comparing data before and after 1995. FAS data are adjusted to address this problem.
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Brazilian  milk  production  grew  even  when  cow 
numbers were falling because of impressive increases 
in milk yield per cow (Figure 8). The trend increase 
in yield since 1993 has been 4.3 percent, more than 
double the rate of growth experienced in the United 
States. However, this increase is from a very low base 
by U.S. standards. Current average annual milk per 
cow is about 1,700 liters (3,750 pounds), less than 20 
percent of the U.S. average milk production.
Because most dairy farms use grazing as the pri-
mary source of feed, milk production in Brazil exhib-
its a seasonal pattern. Monthly production in the fall 
months of April, May and June, when cool, dry weather 
slows grass growth, is 20–25 percent less than during 
the warmer, wetter spring and summer months. While 
more  seasonal  than  U.S.  milk  production,  Brazil’s 
milk production is much more stable than in countries 
such as Ireland that rely even more heavily on rota-
tional grazing and seasonal calving (Figure 9). Hence, 
seasonality does not appear to represent a significant 
problem for the processing sector or a constraint to 
expanding exports.
In 2006, Brazil produced about one-half of the total 
South American milk supply and accounted for about 
one-half  of  the  South American  population  (Figure 
10). Milk production on a per capita basis was 132 
kg. This was exceeded by Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Uruguay. Uruguay led all South Ameri-
can countries in per capita milk production with 509 
kg per person. For comparison, Wisconsin’s per capita 
milk production is about 1,800 kg.
Location of Production
Dairying  in  Brazil  is  geographically  widespread, 
with all states reporting some milk production in 2007 
(Table 6). However, production is concentrated in the 
area bounded by southern Goiás in the north to the 
Uruguay border in the south. Within this region, six 
states (Goiás, Minas Gerais, São Paulo, Paraná, Santa 
Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul) accounted for about 
three-quarters of Brazilian milk production in 2006.
Between 1998 and 2006, the relative rate of growth 
in milk production was greatest in the Northern region, 
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FIGURE 10. South American Milk Production, 2006
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but that area supplied less than 7 percent of Brazil’s 
2006 milk supply and milk production there is used 
principally  for  local  fluid  milk  consumption.  The 
largest absolute growth was shown in Minas Gerais. 
Among major dairy states, São Paulo decreased milk 
production by 12 percent, the result of increasing com-
petitive pressure for land to grow oranges, sugar cane 
and other crops.
Dairy Production Systems
Data relating to the number of dairy farms are only 
collected and reported as part of 10-year agricultural 
censuses, the latest in 1996.5 Projections of the 2005 
dairy herd distribution using the 1996 census informa-
tion are shown in Table 7 [19]:
Most of the 1.2 million farms in the smallest size 
category  are  diversified  farms  with  dual-purpose, 
dairy-beef cows that are milked for relatively short 
5 The complete results of the 2006 census were not available at this writing. The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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periods  during  the  year.  The  number  of  lactating 
cows within this size category is less than half of total 
reported cows. On an annual basis, these smaller farms 
show herd productivity of only 385 kilograms (850 
pounds) per cow. Typically, farmers in this size class 
milk indigenous cows, feed little or no concentrates or 
forages other than grass, breed cows using bulls kept 
on the farm, and use hand milking. Most of the milk 
produced on these small farms is either consumed on-
farm or sold in the large informal market (see Section 
IV).
The remaining farms, most of which are specialized 
dairy farms, have an annual herd average of 2,300 
kilograms (5,066 pounds) per cow. Among specialized 
dairies (including those in the smallest size category), 
there are at least four general production systems, all 
but one of which is pasture-based.6
Irrigated intensive rotational grazing. This system 
is not common presently, but is being promoted by a 
government-supported “Full Bucket” rural develop-
ment program for small producers. The program pro-
motes irrigated pasture management and stresses the 
importance of good herd management and accurate 
record-keeping. While pasture irrigation is not widely 
practiced in Brazil, it can result in significant increases 
TABLE 6.   Change in Brazil Milk Production by State, 
1998–2006
                    Milk Production,        1998–2006  
                    1,000 tons                Change 
State/Region  1998  2006  Tons  %
Brazil  18,694  25,398  6,704  36%
North  903  1,699  796  88%
Pará  311  691  380  122%
Rondônia  372  637  265  71%
Tocantins  140  217  77  55%
Acre  33  98  65  197%
Amazon  35  45  10  29%
Roraima  9  6  –3  –33%
Amapá  3  4  1  33%
Northeast  2,070  3,198  1,128  54%
Bahia  683  906  223  33%
Pernambuco  286  630  344  120%
Ceará  313  380  67  21%
Alagoas  245  228  –17  –7%
Maranhão  138  341  203  147%
Rio Grande du Nord  130  235  105  81%
Sergipe  118  243  125  106%
Paraíba  87  155  68  78%
Piauí  71  80  9  13%
Southeast  8,465  9,740  1,275  15%
Minas Gerais  5,688  7,094  1,406  25%
São Paulo  1,982  1,744  –238  –12%
Rio De Janeiro  455  468  13  3%
Espirito Santo  340  434  94  28%
South  4,411  7,039  2,628  60%
Rio Grande do Sul  1,915  2,625  710  37%
Paraná  1,625  2,704  1,079  66%
Santa Catarina  871  1,710  839  96%
Central-west  2,845  3,722  877  31%
Goiás  1,979  2,614  635  32%
Mato Grosso  406  584  178  44%
Mato Grosso do Sul  427  490  63  15%
Federal district  33  34  1  3%
Source: [19].
6 The largest three of these dairy production systems are described in detail in Babcock Discussion Paper 2001-2 [54] and correspond closely 
to the three larger herd size categories defined in Table 7. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3  17
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in grass production, thus reducing the need for supple-
mental forages or feed concentrates.
Extensive  grazing/limited  supplementation.  In 
this system, the dairy ration consists almost entirely of 
grazed pasture grass. Concentrates and green-chopped 
forages (principally sugar cane) would typically be pro-
vided only during those winter months when pasture 
growth was not sufficient to meet feed requirements. 
Herds employing this system would typically be in 
the 30–70 cow size range noted in Table 7, producing 
1,200–2,000 liters per year. Herds would commonly 
consist  mostly  of  cross-bred  animals  (dual-purpose 
dairy-beef animals and indigenous dairy breeds). Dry 
periods would be 8 to 10 months. Cows in these herds 
are usually hand-milked in parlors. Most of the milk 
from these farms is sold to processors but some would 
enter the informal market.
Semi-confinement. Farms  employing  this  system 
are larger (70–200 cows) and use green-chopped for-
ages  (mostly  sugar  cane),  stored  silage,  by-product 
feeds,  and  concentrates  year-round  to  supplement 
grazed grass. Milk yield is in the range of 2,000 to 
4,500 liters per cow per year. Cows are typically 50–
50 cross bred Holstein x Gyr and artificial insemina-
tion is common. Milk produced on these farms (except 
milk retained for farm use) is sold exclusively to pro-
cessors.
Full confinement. This system is comparable to par-
lor-freestall dairy operations in Wisconsin. Typically, 
purebred  Holsteins  are  fed  conserved  forages,  by- 
product  feeds,  and  concentrates  in  TMR  form  in 
freestall  barns. Annual  per  cow  milk  yields  are  in 
excess  of  4,500  liters,  with  some  farms  achieving 
twice that level. 
Cost of Production
Embrapa Dairy Cattle provides four representative 
dairy farm models for the International Farm Compar-
ison-Dairy project [36]. Two (25 and 50 cows) reflect 
conditions in Rio Grande do Sul and two (90 and 200 
cows) represent the state of Minas Gerais. For 2006, 
full costs of production (including opportunity costs) 
for these farms ranged between US$0.23 and US$0.28 
per  100  kg.  Cash  costs  ranged  from  US$0.18  and 
US$0.25. In comparison, IFCN-generated full costs 
of production for U.S. farms ranged from US$0.25 to 
US$0.31; cash costs from US$0.22 to US$0.30.
More detailed cost information is available from a 
comparison of dairy farms by production system in 
the state of Rio Grande do Sul [54]. While these data 
TABLE 7. Estimated Dairy Herd Size Distribution, Brazil, 2005
                      Herd Size      Total or  
  <30  30–70  70–200  >200  Average
Number of Farms
    Number  1,151,931  107,130  28,110  1,497  1,288,667
    Percent of Total  89.4  8.3  2.2  0.1  100
Milk Production
    1,000 ton  4,598  9,061  9,023  1,889  24,572
    Percent of Total  18.7  36.9  36.7  7.7  100
Number of Cows
    Number (1,000)  11,938  5,400  2,906  387  20,632
    Percent of Total  57.8  26.2  14.1  1.9  100
Liters per Cow per Day  1.2  5  9  13  3
Average Cows per Farm  10  50  103  259  16
Source: [19].The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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(Table 8) are specific to the state of Rio Grande do Sul, 
they appear to be applicable to farms in other states 
within the major producing region of Brazil that use 
similar production practices. Moreover, the production 
systems are comparable to the largest of the four sys-
tems defined by Embrapa, providing further insights 
into the relative costs and profitability by type of pro-
duction system employed.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of milk produc-
tion costs across systems is that total costs per liter are 
practically the same. However, the confinement system 
exhibits relatively high variable costs (reflecting higher 
cost of feed) and relatively low fixed costs (reflecting 
higher milk yields and other economies to size). 
Larger differences among the three production sys-
tems emerge when comparing elements of technical 
and economic efficiency (Table 9). The extensive and 
semi-confined herds have similar land area per cow, 
but the semi-confined herds show significantly larger 
milk  production  per  hectare.  Herds  in  the  confined 
category  have  even  larger  production  per  hectare, 
but this measure is not directly comparable because 
land is used primarily for crop production rather than   
grazing. 
TABLE 8. Dairy Costs and Returns by Production System
      Production System
	 																							Extensive	 	 														Semi-Confined	 																									Confined 
Item  R$/liter  %  R$/liter  %  R$/liter  %
Variable Costs 
    Concentrates and minerals  0.161   32.0%   0.163   33.3%   0.192   38.0% 
    Other purchased feeds  0.069   13.7%   0.065   13.3%   0.087   17.2% 
    Milk hauling  0.072   14.3%   0.042   8.6%   0.040   7.9% 
    Vet and med  0.022   4.4%   0.029   5.9%   0.031   6.1% 
    Breeding  0.008   1.6%   0.011   2.2%   0.011   2.2% 
    Elec., fuels and lubricants   0.026   5.2%   0.025   5.1%   0.024   4.8% 
    Taxes  0.012   2.4%   0.017   3.5%   0.013   2.6% 
    Pasture rent  0.001   0.2%   0.003   0.6%   0.004   0.8% 
    Pasture maintenance  0.000   0.0%   0.002   0.4%   0.000   0.0% 
    Facility repair/improvements  0.003   0.6%   0.005   1.0%   0.005   1.0% 
    Equipment repair/maintenance  0.007   1.4%   0.017   3.5%   0.015   3.0% 
    Dairy supplies  0.004   0.8%   0.003   0.6%   0.003   0.6% 
    Other costs  0.002   0.4%   0.003   0.1%   0.004   0.8% 
Total Variable Costs   0.387   76.9%   0.383   78.2%   0.429   85.0% 
Fixed costs 
    Adm. services and consulting  0.015   3.0%   0.027   5.5%   0.027   5.4% 
    Fees, taxes and interest   0.002   0.4%   0.005   1.0%   0.013   2.6% 
    Depreciation  0.039   7.8%   0.034   6.9%   0.012   2.4% 
    Labor costs   0.060   11.9%   0.041   8.4%   0.024   4.8% 
Total Fixed Costs   0.116   23.1%   0.107   21.8%   0.076   15.0% 
Total costs  0.503     0.490     0.505 
Total receipts   0.574     0.596     0.613 
Net income  0.071     0.106     0.108 
Source: [54]. Costs are for the period October 2004–September 2005 for farms in the vicinity of Castro, PR.Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3  19
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While  concentrate  feeding  varies  substantially 
across  production  systems,  milk  yield  per  unit  of 
concentrate fed is nearly the same. Labor efficiency 
increases with herd size. Daily milk production per 
employee for the semi-confined system is more than 
double what is achieved for the extensive system. The 
confined system shows the highest return on assets, but 
all three models exhibit double-digit or near double-
digit rates of return.
Comparing performance across systems leads to the 
conclusion that all systems are economically viable, 
even at the relatively low milk prices observed in 2005. 
But the greater efficiency and profitability of the semi-
confined and confined systems suggests that growth in 
milk production is likely to come from herds utilizing 
these systems.
Milk Prices
From  1999  through  2004,  milk  prices  in  Brazil 
ranged  between  US$10–$15  per  100  kg  (US$4.50–
$7.00  per  hundredweight).  This  was  about  half  the 
price  level  experienced  in  Wisconsin  (Figure  11). 
These relatively low prices limited incentives for dairy 
expansion. Brazil milk prices rose steadily to the low 
US$20/100 kg mark by early 2007, which was only 
about US$5 under the Wisconsin all-milk price. Since 
then, Brazil milk prices have nearly doubled and have 
come even closer to those experienced in Wisconsin, 
leading to strong profits and encouraging production 
growth.
The level and stability of farm milk prices will be 
a critical factor in the evolution of the Brazilian dairy 
sector.  Stable  milk  prices  at  or  near  current  levels 
will encourage expansion of farms employing higher-
yielding production systems that require major capital 
investment. This will spur gains in milk production 
that will likely exceed those shown recently. If prices 
revert to levels experienced earlier in this decade, then 
growth will be slower, and will be confined largely to 
production systems that are part of diversified farming 
operations that require minimal investment per cow 
and that rely more heavily on grazing for feed.
Supporting Services
Brazil has a good supply of dairy service providers 
in the primary producing region. Veterinarians are in 
especially ample supply—many DVMs are employed 
in other segments of the dairy sector besides animal 
TABLE 9. Measures of Technical and Economic Performance by Production System
    Production System 
	 Extensive	 Semi-Conf.	 Confined
Measures of Size 
    Average herd size   36.50  110.31  423.91
    Cows in lactation (average per day)  22  66  261
    Farm size (hectares)  16.8  43.5  122.2
    Value of assets, incl. land (R$)  216,787  825,787  254,846
    No. of hired employees (full-time equiv.)  1.1  2.0  8.9
    Milk production (1,000 L/year)   123  556  2,705
    Break-even production (1,000 L/year)   101  468  2,246
Measures of Performance
    Milk prod. per hectare (L/ha/year)   7,366  12,790  22,129
    Milk prod. (L) per kg concentrate   2.72  2.71  2.79
    Milk prod. per employee (L/day)   310  766  832
    Return on assets (%)   9.7  13.3  15.3
Source: [54].The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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health. Concentrates, by-product feeds and dairy sup-
plies appear to be readily available. Of particular note, 
the large frozen concentrated orange juice industry of 
Brazil is located in close proximity to the major dairy 
region, making citrus pulp readily available to most 
dairy farms.
Dairy production (and processing) research at the 
federal level is primarily through Embrapa, the Bra-
zilian Agricultural  Research  Corporation,  under  the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply. 
Emprapa’s stated mission is to, “. . . provide feasible 
solutions for the sustainable development of Brazilian 
agribusiness through knowledge and technology gener-
ation and transfer” [18]. Embrapa operates 40 research 
and education centers located throughout Brazil.
The Embrapa Dairy Cattle center is located in Juiz 
de Fora, MG, with satellite field stations in Pacheco 
Colonel, MG, and Valença, RJ. Embrapa has an exten-
sive research agenda covering major aspects of dairy 
farming and dairy processing. Much of this research 
is conducted collaboratively with state organizations, 
state and federal universities, and private dairy com-
panies.
Embrapa’s  educational/extension  programs  also 
cover a broad spectrum of topics relating to both dairy 
production  and  processing.  Information  is  dissemi-
nated through publications, short courses and one-on-
one consulting.
Besides  Embrapa  Dairy  Cattle,  state  and  federal 
universities, dairy plants, and dairy trade associations 
also offer extension support to Brazilian dairy farmers. 
Special extension programs for lower-income farm-
ers are sponsored by the Agency for Agrarian Devel-
opment and Agricultural Extension within the federal 
Agrarian Ministry for Public Works and the Economy 
(separate from the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Food Supply).
Dairy farmers are represented legislatively by the 
Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock of Brazil 
(CNA). CNA’s executive body is a council of represen-
tatives of state agricultural federations. It is organized 
around  21  “theme  groups”  that  involve  commodi-
ties (including dairy) and special interest issues (e.g., 
credit, foreign trade) [9].
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Synopsis
Brazilian milk production has grown more rapidly 
than domestic use since 2004, yielding an increasing 
exportable surplus. Growth has come from more cows 
and more milk per cow. While more than 1.2 million 
Brazilian  farms  produce  milk,  about  135,000  herds 
with more than 30 cows account for more than 80 per-
cent of Brazil’s milk production and an even larger 
proportion of milk sold in the formal market. Recent 
growth in milk production has been spurred by strong 
milk prices that have encouraged investment in these 
larger  dairies  that  employ  higher-yield  production 
strategies.
IV. DAIRY PROCESSING SECTOR
Overview
Brazil’s dairy processors are part of a rapidly-evolv-
ing, multi-faceted industry. Fluid milk constitutes about 
one-third of total dairy products processed and mar-
keted in Brazil. UHT milk represents 70 to 75 percent 
of fluid milk sold in the country. The informal mar-
ket (mostly non-federally inspected milk) constitutes 
about 35 percent of the milk consumed in the country. 
Milk powders—a major export item for Brazil’s dairy 
industry—represent a growing segment in the dairy 
processing business in Brazil. Processing concentra-
tion is increasing rapidly in the industry. Finally, new 
entrants into dairy processing from Brazil’s meat pro-
cessing business (e.g., Perdigão and Sadia) have con-
tributed  to  the  increased  concentration  and  provide 
competition for existing processors. 
Structure of Brazil’s Dairy Processing Industry
Brazil’s dairy processing sector is extensive, diverse 
and complex. It consists of a large informal sector and 
a formal sector with a few large private companies and 
federated cooperatives and a large number of local 
cooperatives.
Informal milk is product that is not sold to feder-
ally-inspected  dairy  plants.  The  estimated  volume 
has been fairly constant over the past 10 years at 8 
to 9 million tons [57]. Because milk production has 
increased rapidly, the percentage sold informally has 
decreased from more than 41 percent in 1998 to 32.5 
percent in 2007. The ultimate use of informal milk is 
not officially recorded, but USDEC estimated that in 
2006, about 6.5 million tons was used to manufac-
ture various cheeses. Milk used to produce cheese in   
federally-inspected plants in 2006 was only 4.2 mil-
lion tons. 
TABLE 10.   Selected Statistics for Largest Brazilian Dairy 
Processors, 2007
	 	 	Affiliated	Producers 
        Average  
        Daily  
    Milk Receipts     Production 
Rank  Company  (1,000 liters)  Number  (liters)
1  DPA*  1,800,000  5,800  567
2  ELEGÊ  1,324,007  18,801  130
3  ITAMBÉ  1,090,000  9,067  284
4  Parmalat  725,021  4,457  286
5  Bom Gosto   632,735  9,690  138
6  Laticínios Morrinhos  387,140  4,500  225
7  Embaré  336,573  2,208  395
8  Confepar  333,490  7,393  90
9  Centroleite  300,095  5,265  156
10  Líder Alimentos  248,725  5,390  114
11  CCL  247,950  2,439  134
12  Batávia  246,459  4,215  160
13  Frimesa   225,804  4,847  123
14  Danone  222,091  418  865
15  Nilza Alimentos  219,449  872  131
16  Group Vigor  201,300  1,213  313
Total/Average  8,292,889  86,575  200
* DPA acquisitions of raw milk by Fonterra for processing by   
Nestle.
Note: Average daily production cannot be calculated by compar-
ing number of producers and total milk receipts because most 
companies use spot market purchases to acquire varying amounts 
of their total milk supply.
Source: [19].The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
22  Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3
Brazil’s 16 largest dairy processors, ranked in terms 
of milk receipts in 2007, are listed in Table 10. While 
this is a recent Brazilian dairy processor list, it fails to 
take into account some the mergers, acquisitions, and 
consolidations that have occurred in recent months. 
Certain firms in the list, which have been acquired by 
Perdigão (e.g., Batavia, Elegê and CCL Cooperative) 
and Sadia will be noted later in this section.
Leading processors include a mix of large federated 
cooperatives  (e.g.,  Itambé,  Confepar,  Centroleite), 
private Brazilian companies (e.g., Embaré, Nilza Ali-
mentos, Group Vigor), and widely-recognized multi-
national companies (e.g., Nestle, Parmalat, Danone). 
The  combined  milk  receipts  of  the  16  top  proces-
sors represented about one-half of the total receipts 
of federally-inspected plants. The other one-half was 
acquired by more than 1,100 smaller plants, 60 percent 
of which process less than 10,000 liters per day. Most 
of these smaller processors are local cooperatives that 
also provide feed and dairy supplies to their members. 
To remain viable, these small cooperatives are increas-
ingly  joining  with  others  to  collectively  process  or 
market their milk through contractual arrangements.
The leading processors show significant differences 
in  the  number  and  average  size  of  producers  from 
whom they draw their milk supply. The extremes are 
Condefar, which acquires milk from 7,400 producers 
averaging 90 liters per day, and Danone, with 418 reg-
ular suppliers averaging 865 liters per day. 
Increases  in  dairy  processing  concentration  have 
occurred  in  Brazil  in  recent  years  as  milk  proces-
sors have sought to countervail the growing power 
of domestic supermarkets, gain scale economies, and 
secure  milk  and  dairy  product  marketing  improve-
ments that can be achieved via increased scale [23]. 
This  trend  will  undoubtedly  continue,  reducing  the 
size of the competitive fringe of processors and per-
haps increasing the international competitiveness of 
Brazilian dairy processors. 
However,  Brazil’s  dairy  processing  industry  will 
not soon approach the concentration levels found in 
major dairy exporting countries, such as New Zealand, 
Denmark and the Netherlands. In the early 2000s, one 
processing firm accounted for 80 percent or more of 
the milk processed in both New Zealand and Denmark 
and two firms processed 80 percent or more of the milk 
in the Netherlands [12].
Product Mix
Figure 12 shows use of milk by the formal sector in 
2006. Forty percent of the milk processed by inspected 
plants was sold as pasteurized or Ultra High Tempera-
ture (UHT) fluid milk. Cheese and milk powders (SMP 
and WMP) together absorbed about one-half of the 
formal sector milk supply. Milk powders and sweet-
ened condensed milk (SCM) (4 percent of milk use) 
are produced largely for export.
Use of Brazilian milk production for fluid milk grew 
from 3.7 million liters in 1992 to 6.6 million liters in 
2006 (Figure 13). Nearly all of that growth was in the 
form of UHT, or long-life milk. The growth of UHT 
milk sales in Brazil provides additional background 
on developments in Brazil’s dairy processing indus-
try. The rapid increase in UHT milk processing and 
sales has made it possible for the industry to produce 
fluid milk for sale in cities distant from milk process-
ing plants. One official interviewed by the study team 
argued that UHT milk has detrimentally eliminated 
the regional definition of dairy production in Brazil’s 
dairy industry. The UHT milk processing segment also 
has been at the forefront of industry consolidation in 
recent years. Finally, UHT milk plants have been a 
vehicle by which new entrants have gained a foothold 
in  Brazil’s  dairy  processing  industry.  Perdigão,  for 
example, entered dairy processing partly by purchas-
ing UHT milk plants.
FIGURE 12.   Utilization of Brazil Milk, Receipts by 
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Exports of sweetened condensed milk (SCM), which 
once accounted for half of Brazil’s dairy export value, 
have  remained  strong  in  absolute  terms,  but  repre-
sented only one-sixth of 2007 dairy export value.8
Brazil  has  gone  from  a  large  importer  of  dairy 
products to a major net exporter. Its dairy trade bal-
ance measured in value went from a deficit of more 
than US$500 million in 1998 to a surplus of about 
US$150 million in 2007 (Figure 15). Clearly, much of 
the recent growth in Brazil’s milk production has gone 
to import substitution.
Brazil’s  dairy  exports  are  widely  scattered  geo-
graphically. In 2007, Venezuela, Algeria and Senegal 
accounted  for  about  one-half  of  total  export  value 
[2, p. 93]. No other country took more than 3.1 per-
cent. The U.S. was a minor export market, absorbing 
US$6.5  million,  2.4  percent  of  Brazil’s  total  dairy 
export value. U.S. dairy exports to Brazil in 2007 were 
valued at US$16.5 million. Over the past 10 years, 
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Brazil Dairy Exports
While numerous facets of Brazil’s dairy industry are 
important, we are particularly interested in the capac-
ity  of  Brazil’s  dairy  processing  industry  to  expand 
dairy exports. 
Dairy  exports  represent  less  than  1  percent  of 
Brazil’s huge agricultural export value (see previous 
section), but have grown significantly in this decade 
(Table 11). In 2007, total dairy export value was $300 
million  compared  to  $8  million  in  1999.7  In  2008, 
dairy exports through July were nearly equal to 2007’s 
annual total.
Skim and whole milk powders (SMP and WMP) 
represented  more  than  60  percent  of  Brazil’s  2007 
dairy export value (Figure 14) and an even larger share 
of 2008 exports through July. Powder exports are about 
75 percent WMP [27]. The growth in powder exports 
has been remarkable, from less than US$1 million in 
1999 to nearly US$200 million so far in 2008 [43]. 
7 Brazil dairy exports in 2007 were 10 percent of U.S. dairy exports. 
8 Production of canned sweetened condensed milk takes advantage of two commodities in plentiful supply in Brazil: tin and sugar.The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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dairy trade between Brazil and the U.S. has been small 
and, on average, balanced.
Geographical diversification in Brazil dairy exports 
should help to spread exporting risk over a number of 
countries. However, diversification also requires Bra-
zilian dairy exporters to become familiar with cus-
tomer requirements in a large number of countries. 
As noted earlier Brazil’s dairy industry consists of a 
relatively few big firms and a large competitive fringe. 
FIGURE 14. Composition of Brazil Dairy Exports, 2007
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TABLE 11. Evolution of Brazil Dairy Exports, 1997–2008
                     Value in US$ 
  Milk   Condensed   
Year  Powders  Milk & Cream  Cheese  Butter  Other  Total
1997  2,825,540  1,137,535  1,668,671  3,460,911  1,563,648  10,656,305
1998  2,681,404  1,316,583  3,431,704  172,213  980,659  8,582,563
1999  532,041  2,522,966  3,394,093  83,539  1,629,091  8,161,730
2000  595,648  4,422,849  7,014,191  162,547  3,383,561  15,578,79
2001  1,823,583  8,212,727  6,343,825  3,611,075  7,381,565  27,372,775
2002  6,310,816  22,639,964  4,973,307  446,998  7,755,194  42,126,279
2003  10,225,033  27,057,947  6,799,718  2,562,838  10,343,141  56,988,677
2004  47,664,180  29,403,343  14,576,078  1,848,151  20,102,041  113,593,793
2005  59,592,033  36,268,113  28,883,367  3,551,290  22,415,717  150,710,520
2006  44,155,471  69,245,445  20,936,145  2,834,101  31,538,847  168,710,009
2007  181,332,962  52,085,700  25,724,166  9,417,303  31,004,774  299,564,905
2008*  197,644,271  50,630,338  18,607,301  9,600,549  14,514,639  290,997,098
*Total, January–July.
Source: [43].
On average Brazil’s dairy processing plants are small 
compared to processing plants in major dairy export 
countries, suggesting constrained ability to meet inter-
national competition. 
An exception is milk condensers and dryers. About 
15 percent of the country’s major milk powder and 
SCM processors have installed capacity of 1.0 to 1.5 
million  liters  of  milk  per  day  and  10  percent  have 
capacity of 600,000 to 800,000 liters of milk per day. 
Evidence suggests that a processing capacity of about 
500,000  liters  per  day  is  necessary  to  be  competi-
tive [57, p. 65]. Thus, by this measure one-quarter of 
Brazil’s milk powder and SCM processors may have 
the scale of production that would help to make them 
competitive in international markets.
A somewhat different picture of Brazil’s dairy pro-
cessing industry is presented by a listing of major for-
eign  multinational  firms  operating  in  Brazil’s  dairy 
industry (Table 12). While many of these firms serve 
mainly the Brazilian domestic market, these firms pre-
sumably could become involved in exporting Brazilian 
dairy  products  if  prospective  exporting  profits  war-
rant. However, with a few notable exceptions (such as 
Nestle and Fonterra) this listing suggests potential for 
expanded Brazilian dairy exports rather than tangible 
prospects for actual expansion of dairy exports.Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3  25
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Major Dairy Exporting Firms
Dairy  Partners  of America  (DPA)  and  SERLAC 
pioneered the exporting of dairy products from Brazil. 
DPA, which represents a joint venture between Nestle 
and Fonterra of New Zealand, was launched on Janu-
ary 1, 2003 [24, (11/17/03), p. 11]. Headquartered in 
Brazil, DPA began its operations in Brazil, Argentina 
and Venezuela, and expanded later to Chile, Ecuador, 
Colombia and the Caribbean Islands. Initially, Nestle’s 
seven milk plants in Brazil served as the production 
base for DPA. 
USDEC reported that in 2006 and 2007 about 55 
percent of total Brazilian dairy exports were manufac-
tured by DPA and Nestle [57, p. 64]. The exports con-
sisted mainly of bulk bags of milk powder and cans of 
SCM. 
Nestle. Switzerland-based  Nestle  has  had  opera-
tions in Brazil for about a century, with plants located 
throughout the country. This dispersion of plants helps 
Nestle to spread price and weather-related risks geo-
graphically. In addition, by being positioned to sell 
dairy products in the state where the products are man-
ufactured, the company avoids taxes associated with 
interstate sales of dairy products. 
Nestle is frequently mentioned as a price-leader in 
setting farm milk prices in Brazil. However, a number 
of processors interviewed by the study team disputed 
this claim, arguing that this may be the case only in 
areas  where  Nestle  faced  little  competition  in  milk 
procurement.
Most dairy processors interviewed by the study team 
conceded that Nestle would be a top player in Brazil’s 
dairy  industry  for  the  foreseeable  future.  However, 
many of these same officials pointed out that Perdigão 
is challenging Nestle for the top spot in the industry.
Fonterra. This  cooperative  is  the  world’s  largest 
dairy exporting firm with dairy sales in 140 countries. 
Fonterra’s  expertise  in  dairy  exporting  and  foreign 
direct investment in dairy-food businesses undoubt-
edly will help to expand Brazil’s dairy exports if profit 
prospects warrant such an expansion. 
DPA announced plans in early 2008 to build a new 
milk processing plant in Palmeira das Missoes in the 
Rio Grande do Sul with a capacity to process about 
one million liters of milk per day [3]. The milk would 
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be used to produce Nestle’s branded dairy and other 
food products to meet expected demand increases in 
Brazil. It is not clear how the plant figures into DPA’s 
dairy exporting plans. 
SERLAC. SERLAC was the first Brazilian trading 
company to export the country’s dairy products (mostly 
milk powder) under the Brazilian Dairy Board brand 
[24,  (11/17/03),  p.  11].  SERLAC  initially  included 
five major dairies and cooperatives: Itambé, Confepar, 
CCL (Paulista), Embaré and Ilpisa. In the early to mid-
2000s, SERLAC focused mainly on selling milk pow-
der to Algeria, Morocco, Libya, the Middle East and 
Latin America. 
In late 2007, SERLAC evolved into a joint venture 
supported by Sertrading S/A and Itambé, after Itambé 
bought  out  the  interests  of  the  other  four  partners. 
Itambé described the history of SERLAC and purpose 
of the Sertrading-Itambé joint venture as follows [40, 
p. 1 of Serlac Insert]:
We were created to manage and coordinate dairy 
product exports and imports, working with different 
sorts of markets. We are the largest genuinely dairy 
product exporter, operating in more than 60 coun-
tries in the Americas, Asia, Africa, and the Middle-
East. Our company played a fundamental role in 
integrating Brazil into the international dairy prod-
uct market. We turned the country into a new supply 
alternative  and  a  potential  and  permanent  mar-
ket player. We provide our clients with high qual-
ity commercial, financial and operational services, 
as well as technical expertise on products and . . . 
[their] uses based on in-depth experience in foreign 
trade and international dairy product markets.
It is not fully clear why Itambé became the only 
dairy processor to export dairy products through SER-
LAC. However, an Embaré official said that he thought 
the return for his firm was too low to compensate for 
the 5 percent handling charge levied by SERLAC for 
handling export sales. The dissolution of a multi-firm 
TABLE 12. Major Foreign Multinational Companies Operating in Brazil’s Dairy Industry
Company/Headquarters  Type of Business  Dairy Products Manufactured or Handled
Cargill, U.S  Manufacturer  Dried whey and other
Danone, France  Manufacturer    Yogurts, chilled desserts, yogurt, whey drinks, 
fermented milk, cream cheese spread and other
Arla Foods, Denmark and Sweden Manufacturer  White cheese, spreads
Nestle and Fonterra, Switzerland   Manufacturer, exporter   WMP, SMP, chilled dairy items, yogurts, yogurt  
and New Zealand (DPA)  and importer  whey drinks, fermented milk, desserts and other
Kerry Ingredients, Ireland  Manufacturer, importer and exporter  Whey/milk modified milk
Kraft Foods, U.S  Manufacturer  Philadelphia cream cheese
Nestle, Switzerland  Manufacturer    SCM, sterilized creams, caramel toffee spread, 
sterilized dairy cake fillings, ice cream, flavored 
milk, infant formula, and other
Parmalat, Brazil*  Manufacturer    SCM, cream, sterilized dairy desserts, imported 
ice cream, UHT milk and flavored milk
Pepsico, U.S.  Manufacturer  Flavored milk
Bongrain, France  Manufacturer, importer and exporter  Cheeses
Schreiber, U.S  Manufacturer, importer and exporter  Processed cheese
Unilever, UK and Netherlands  Manufacturer  Ice cream
Yakult, Japan  Manufacturer  Fermented milk
Source: [57, pp. 61–62]. 
*Parmalat Brazil is no longer affiliated with the former parent Italian company. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3  27
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export trading organization is not unusual. As indi-
vidual firm members of a multi-firm export trading 
company gain marketing proficiency, they often opt to 
market products on their own to avoid the complexity 
involved in operating through a multi-firm exporting 
company.
Itambé.  This  federated  cooperative—which  is 
owned  by  29  local  cooperatives—is  probably  the 
second  largest  milk  processor  in  Brazil.  However, 
the exact ranking of Brazil’s dairy processors is now 
uncertain given the emergence of Perdigão as a major 
dairy processor. Itambé’s six dairy plants in the Minas 
Gerais and Goias states produce the most complete line 
of dairy products in Brazil. Itambé is expanding invest-
ments to increase production of milk powder and SCM 
for export. Among Itambé’s noteworthy investments is 
a new milk powder plant built near Uberlandia, with 
capacity to process about 1.2 million liters of milk per 
day. The new plant will manufacture products mainly 
for export. 
Itambé  has  the  reputation  of  being  efficiently- 
managed.  Indeed,  in  Brazil’s  dairy  industry  where 
many small and medium-size cooperatives are experi-
encing financial trouble, Itambé is described in favor-
able terms as a successful cooperative that is run like 
a corporation. 
Itambé President, Jacques Gontijo Alvarez, in an 
interview conducted by the study team, described the 
firm’s most difficult challenge, as being “short of the 
capital” needed to be competitive with large multi-
national firms such as Nestle and Parmalat. To cope 
with this challenge, Itambé has chosen to transform 
itself into a cooperative/PLC, which would ultimately 
sell shares on Brazil’s stock market. One use of the 
capital raised as a cooperative/PLC will be to expand 
processing operations in southern Brazil where milk 
prices are lower. Thus, Itambé will join several Irish 
dairy  cooperatives  (e.g.,  Kerry  Group,  Glanbia  and 
Dairygold)  in  moving  to  cooperative/PLC  status  to 
raise capital and achieve other objectives [12]. 
New Entrants: Perdigão and Sadia. These two firms, 
which previously were primarily involved in beef, pork 
and poultry processing, have become important play-
ers in Brazil’s dairy processing industry in the past two 
years. Both are large: Perdigão had gross revenues of 
7.8 billion reals in 2007 (about US$4.22 billion) [17]. 
Sadia’s gross sales totaled US$5 billion in 2007 [52].
The strategic behavior of Perdigão and Sadia prior 
to their entry into dairy processing in Brazil has an 
unusual history, as noted below [47, p. 1]:
Twelve months after a hostile takeover attempt, in 
which Sadia tried to buy Perdigão, Brazil’s top two 
poultry (and meat) producers reversed positions. 
Perdigão passed Sadia when it finalized an acquisi-
tion of Eleva Alimentos in February . . . The unsuc-
cessful takeover attempt in 2006 spurred Perdigão 
to revise its business strategies and enter an accel-
erated growth mode with a goal of strengthening 
the company and reducing vulnerability for future 
takeover  bids.  To  insure  survival,  the  company 
began aggressively pursuing growth domestically 
and within the global market. Focusing on different 
business areas and not just meats, and supported 
by a significant investment program, Perdigão went 
shopping.
Perdigão’s acquisition of Batavia, one of the firm’s 
most noteworthy acquisitions in Brazil’s dairy process-
ing business, is described below [17, p. 7]:
In November (2007), Perdigão acquired full capi-
tal control of Batavia, following the completion of 
agreements with the Agromilk, Castrolanda, Batavo 
and Capal for the acquisition of the remaining 49% 
stake held by these cooperatives in the company’s 
capital stock. The business was worth a total of 
R$155 million. Perdigão had held a majority stake 
in Batavia (51%) since mid-2006.
In June 2008, Perdigão further increased its invest-
ments in Brazil’s dairy business when it announced 
that it would spend 65 million reals (US$39.7 million) 
to build a new powdered milk plant in Rio Grande do 
Sul [29]. 
Sadia’s entry into Brazil dairy processing industry 
has emphasized the cheese business. This is a logical 
focus partly because Sadia uses cheeses that the com-
pany now produces in its pizza products. 
Sadia announced its entry into a major joint venture 
with Kraft in 2008, which Nasser described as follows 
[46, pp. 1–2]:The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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U.S. company Kraft and Sadia S.A. . . . have estab-
lished a joint venture for the production, trade and 
distribution of cheese under the brand Philadelphia, 
produced by Kraft, together with cheeses and pates 
produced by Sadia. The announcement of the joint 
venture . . . forecasts initial investment of 30 million 
Brazilian reals (US$17.8 million) in the Kraft unit 
in Curitiba (capital of the southern Brazilian state 
of Parana). The beginning of activities of the new 
company is forecasted for the second half of August 
2008.
Sadia’s joint venture with Kraft is part of a strategy 
for remaining competitive with Perdigão in Brazil’s 
dairy business, as explained below [46, p. 2]:
 . . . This joint venture is one more Sadia step in the 
direction of diversification of its activities. This way, 
it expands its production scale and competitiveness, 
getting ready to face giants in the sector, like Per-
digão. The main Sadia competitor has been operat-
ing in the dairy sector since it purchased Batavia   
. . . in 2006. In the following year, Perdigão became 
the leader in the UHT milk sector after purchasing 
Eleva in the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande 
do Sul. The operation placed Perdigão ahead of 
Sadia in revenues and market value.
Perdigão and Sadia both have long-standing export-
ing operations associated with their meat sales in many 
countries. Presumably these export market channels 
could be put to profitable use for dairy exporting if 
conditions warrant. 
While Perdigão and Sadia had incentives to acquire 
other businesses as part of growth strategies, it is some-
what unusual for meat processing firms to enter the 
dairy processing business. Various explanations were 
reported to the study team for this strategic behavior, 
including the following:
•  Expertise gained in processing and marketing 
meat products can be employed in the dairy 
business. 
•  Personnel with specialized skills in dairy product 
manufacturing and marketing can be hired by 
Perdigão and Sadia to handle tasks that the meat 
companies are not equipped to carry out. 
•  Existing milk plants—especially UHT milk 
plants—were available to purchase.
•  Producer milk supplies accompanied the plants 
purchased.
•  Diminishing financial returns were being 
encountered by the firms in meat processing, 
marketing, and exporting. Dairy processing 
and marketing was regarded as a higher return 
alternative than additional investments in the 
meat business. 
•  Cheese processing businesses were considered 
to be attractive investments partly because the 
cheese could be used in pizzas produced by the 
firms. 
While these points support the entry of the meat 
companies into dairy processing, one caveat should be 
noted. In part, the meat companies entered dairy pro-
cessing by purchasing UHT milk companies. Several 
dairy industry officials interviewed by the study team 
characterized the efficiency of the plants and quality of 
the products produced in the acquired UHT milk com-
panies as being poor. 
Other Brazilian firms that previously exported dairy 
products through SERLAC and that might be expected 
to expand dairy exports include those discussed below 
[39, pp. 41–49]: 
•  Confepar. This is a large cooperative located 
in northern Parana state. Confepar’s domestic 
sales (marketed under the Polly and Confepar 
brands) include UHT milk, pasteurized milk, 
flavored milk, whey dairy drinks and WMP. 
The cooperative, which is one of the principal 
suppliers of bulk milk powder in Brazil, is 
expanding its exporting capabilities. 
•  CCL (Paulista): After the sale of the chilled 
dairy products division of Leite Paulista to 
Danone in 2000, CCL continued to produce 
pasteurized milk, butter, fresh cream, WMP 
and SMP using the Paulista trademark under 
license, and UHT milk and doce de leite using 
the Long brand name. CCL has a modern factory 
in Itumbiara, GO, which manufactures milk 
powder, butter, and UHT milk. This firm, which 
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appear to be gearing up to expand dairy exports 
substantially prior to its acquisition by Perdigão. 
Whether this focus will change under the new 
ownership is unclear. 
•  Embaré: Headquartered in Minas Gerais, 
Embaré was the seventh ranked Brazilian dairy 
in terms of milk acquisition in 2007. Embaré’s 
principal product is milk powder, followed by 
toffees (exported to 40 countries), and SCM. In 
mid-2005, Embaré began to operate a new SCM 
plant with capacity to produce 36 thousand tons 
per year. The firm is investing to increase its 
production capacity for milk powder and SCM, 
with an eye to becoming an early mover in 
expanding exports of these products.
•  Ilpisa: Ilpisa operates production plants in three 
Brazilian states. Ilpisa acquired certain plants 
from Fleischmann Royal Nabisco (Kraft) when 
Kraft sought to exit from the dairy business in 
Brazil. This firm focuses heavily on selling UHT 
milk products, yogurt, cream and butter in the 
domestic market. 
•  In addition to these companies that once 
comprised SERLAC, Sudcoop is another 
Brazilian firm that might become more prominent 
in dairy exporting [39]. Headquartered in Parana 
state, this firm operates five dairy plants and one 
meat processing plant. The processor sells UHT 
milk, pasteurized milk, yogurt, dairy drinks, 
butter, cream and several types of cheese under 
the Frimesa brand. In 2004, Sudcoop exported 
about 46 percent of the 1,800 tons of cheese that 
it produced to Pizza Hut subsidiaries in South 
Korea, Chile, and other countries. Sudcoop’s 
cheese exports consist mainly of mozzarella 
cheese.
Synopsis 
A  mixed  picture  emerges  regarding  the  capacity 
of Brazilian firms to expand dairy exports. There are 
several  positive  developments,  which  might  foster 
expanded exports of Brazilian dairy products:
•  Brazil’s milk production, which is likely to grow 
by about 4 percent per year, is increasing more 
rapidly than domestic consumption of dairy 
products. 
•  WMP production—a major Brazilian dairy 
export—is growing rapidly, doubling from 2000 
to 2007. 
•  A number of major multi-national firms operating 
in Brazil have the experience and exporting 
networks needed to expand dairy exports if profit 
prospects warrant. 
•  DPA partner, Fonterra, has the capacity to expand 
Brazilian dairy exports substantially if profit 
prospects and other developments are favorable. 
Fonterra’s capacity results from experience the 
cooperative has gained while becoming the 
world’s largest private dairy exporter. 
•  Certain other large and small dairy firms in Brazil 
are gearing up to expand exports—apparently 
in the belief that supply conditions in Brazil 
and world demand conditions may call for such 
actions. Itambé is prominent in the large firm 
group.
•  Firms previously involved mostly in the meat 
business (especially Perdigão and Sadia) have 
entered dairy processing in Brazil. These firms 
have extensive meat exporting experience and 
exporting infrastructure, which could be used to 
advantage to expand Brazil’s dairy exports. 
On the negative side of the export prospects is Bra-
zil’s strong currency, the real. According to reports 
received by the study team, the strength of the real 
already has curbed exports of certain Brazilian dairy 
products,  forcing  some  companies  to  divert  dairy 
products previously exported to the domestic market. 
And it is unclear that the real will weaken substantially 
anytime soon. Lower farm milk prices probably will 
be needed to permit expanded dairy exports if the real 
remains near its current value relative to the U.S. dol-
lar. In addition, Brazilian firms do not have an export 
culture for dairy products. Thus, the firms will need to 
continue to work on establishing a tradition for Brazil 
as a supplier of high quality dairy products in Africa, 
the Middle East and Asia.The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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V. AGRICULTURAL AND TRADE POLICIES IN BRAZIL
This  section  discusses  Brazil’s  agricultural  and 
trade policies, emphasizing how those policies affect 
Brazil’s dairy industry. The analysis focuses on iden-
tifying economic implications of existing policies and 
on how Brazil’s agricultural and trade policies have 
helped to transform the country into a major agricul-
tural exporter.
Agricultural Policy Eras 
Brazil’s  agricultural  policies  have  evolved  from 
measures featuring massive government intervention 
in  agriculture  via  price  supports,  government  pur-
chases and storage from the mid-1960s through the 
early 1980s to programs involving mostly subsidized 
credit  for  the  agricultural  sector  in  the  mid-2000s 
(Table 13). 
As  a  result  of  the  evolution  in  policies,  govern-
ment support for agriculture in Brazil declined to the 
equivalent of only about 3 percent of farm receipts in 
2005. In the mid-2000s, the comparable figures were 
2 percent for New Zealand, 4 percent in Australia, 8 
percent in China, 18 percent in the U.S. and 34 per-
cent in the European Union [7]. Unilateral reductions 
in trade barriers accompanied the evolution in agricul-
tural policies. Consequently, Brazil’s average applied 
tariff on agrifood products fell to 12.5 percent in the 
mid-2000s [7].
Milk prices in Brazil were decontrolled under pol-
icy measures adopted in the early 1990s. Government 
farm milk prices controls were lifted in late 1990 and 
consumer milk prices were eliminated in late 1991, 
ending a long history of government intervention in 
Brazil’s dairy sector [24 (11/30/95), p. 6]. The only 
government dairy programs remaining in effect imme-
diately after these changes were those limiting imports 
of subsidized dairy products and programs to stimu-
late demand through government purchases of dairy 
products for distribution to low-income people [24, 
(11/30/95), p. 8]. 
TABLE 13. Evolution of Agricultural Policies in Brazil
Period  Nature of Policies
Mid-1960s to Early 1980s    Consisted of extensive government intervention in agricultural commodity markets primarily 
by means of price support mechanisms, including government purchases and storage of excess 
supplies. Rural credit subsidies also were employed. 
Late 1980s    In response to the debt crisis of the 1980s, the Brazilian government reduced support to farmers 
and reviewed agricultural policy goals. This led to policies that departed from the import substi-
tution measures for a host of products that permeated agricultural policies from the 1960s up to 
the late 1980s.
Early 1990s    Economy-wide structural reforms further reduced the distortions produced by Brazil’s agri-
cultural policies by eliminating export taxes and price controls, deregulating and liberalizing 
agricultural commodity markets, unilaterally reducing trade barriers, and introducing private 
instruments for agricultural financing.
Mid-1990s    Measures to facilitate land reform and family farming objectives were introduced in 1995. 
About 500,000 new family farms were established on expropriated land. Additional measures 
to promote family agriculture were adopted including subsidized credit, capacity building, 
research programs, and extension services.
Early to Mid-2000s    Brazil increased its financial support to the agricultural sector via government credit. The gov-
ernment credit system provides financial resources to farmers and agribusinesses at subsidized, 
fixed low-interest rates through production and marketing programs, investment programs and 
specialized programs for agribusinesses. 
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Deregulation of Brazil’s milk prices created incen-
tives for increased foreign direct investment in Brazil’s 
dairy  industry  beginning  in  about  1995.  Foreigners 
investing in Brazil’s dairy industry after the mid-1990s 
included Danone (France), Parmalat (Italy), Fleisch-
man  Royal  (U.S.),  Milkaut  (Argentina),  Mastellone 
(Argentina),  Royal  Numico  (Netherlands),  Nestle 
(Switzerland) and New Zealand Dairy Board-Fonterra 
(New Zealand) [24, (10/25/02), p. 3].
Brazil’s Credit Subsidies. In recent years, Brazil’s 
government  has  employed  a  complex  set  of  credit 
subsidies to foster development of various farm and 
agribusiness sectors. A few credit subsidies that focus 
mainly on Brazil’s dairy sector are discussed below. 
USDA-FAS reported in 2002 that the government’s 
Pro-Leite fund provided about US$74 million for pro-
grams to increase milk production and milk quality in 
Brazil [24, (10/25/02), p.2]. The Pro-Leite fund was 
used mainly by milk producers in the Center-West to 
increase their productivity.
In 2005, Brazil’s National Bank of Economic and 
Social Development made available US$43 million in 
credit to finance new investments for powdered milk 
production. This government credit program supple-
mented domestic and private sector capital, bringing 
total  investments  for  powdered  milk  production  to 
US$100 million [24, (10/18/05), p.8]. 
Brazil  expanded  the  amount  of  subsidized  credit 
available to farmers in the mid-2000s under some 23 
different  programs. According  to  the  USDA’s  Eco-
nomic Research Service (ERS), government agricul-
tural credit administered by the Brazilian Ministry of 
Agriculture and disbursed through the National System 
of Rural Credit rose to US$13 billion in 2004/2005, 
up 48 percent from a year earlier [21]. The National 
Rural Credit System provided financial resources at 
subsidized, fixed low-interest rates through production 
and marketing programs (60 percent of total), invest-
ment programs (30 percent of total), and programs for 
financing agribusinesses at market rates (10 percent of 
total). 
In  the  mid-2000s,  subsidized  interest  rate  loans 
were made available to Brazilian farmers under gov-
ernment programs at interest rates of 8.75 percent to 
12.75 percent. The higher interest rates were charged 
farmers with larger annual incomes. Subsidized loans 
made available under the investment programs could 
be used for a host of purposes, including development 
of milk production facilities and purchase of milk pro-
duction equipment. These interest rates were substan-
tially lower than the then current average market rates 
of 16 to 20 percent per year for farm loans. 
Brazil’s government announced in April 2006 an 
emergency credit program of nearly US$8.0 billion to 
alleviate farmers’ debt problems caused by droughts in 
the previous two growing seasons, appreciation of the 
real relative to the U.S. dollar, and higher production 
costs. The measures announced fell mainly in three 
program  areas:  (a)  additional  credit  to  support  the 
marketing of the current year’s crops, (b) relaxation of 
payment terms for the previous year’s investment and 
production loans, and (c) crop insurance. These mea-
sures represented the second year of emergency credit 
assistance to Brazilian farmers [24, (5/2/06)].
Brazil announced in June 2007 a new Agricultural 
and Livestock Plan for the 2007/2008 season, which 
allocates US$30.5 billion in total credit for the sec-
tor, up 16 percent from the year-earlier figure. The 
plan makes available 8.75 percent, subsidized loans to 
dairy farmers and processors under the following pro-
grams [24, (10/18/07), p. 4]:
•  Moderagro II: For the 2007/2008 marketing 
year, nearly US$1.0 billion in funds were 
allocated for the program. The program was 
initially designed for pasture improvement 
and was recently modified to include soil 
erosion reduction programs and conservation 
of lowlands. Moderagro II also incorporated 
a previous program called Pro-Leite, which 
is designed to modernize milk producer’s 
operations, provide incentives for cooling milk at 
the farm, transportation, and silage production. 
•  Moderinfra. This program helps dairy producers 
to build or rebuild silos and warehouses on their 
farms. The measure was recently modified to 
include irrigation systems. Brazil’s government 
allocated US$263 million for the program for 
2007/2008.
C. Phillips of Dairy Australia observed that while 
Brazil’s farmers have access to subsidized and emer-
gency credit, credit remains a problem for the coun-
try’s farmers [49, p. 6]:The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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[Brazil’s] interest rates are as high as 20%. While 
family farms can access interest rate subsidies for 
some borrowings, one result of the high cost is that 
borrowing  tends  to  be  short-term  and  predomi-
nantly for production expenses rather than for capi-
tal investment for expansion. Access to capital also 
remains  limited  because  of  perceived  credit  risk 
particularly with small scale farms and the unde-
veloped financial sector in rural areas.
Brazil’s  government  has  pinned  its  hopes  for 
expanded infrastructure investment to improve trans-
portation of agricultural products partly on a public-
private partnership created in the mid-2000s. Brazil’s 
government  hoped  that  the  program  would  lead  to 
yearly investments in infrastructure of US$6.5 billion, 
60 percent more than then current public investment 
[24 (14/12/06), p. 2]. The program involves govern-
ment guarantees of private investment projects. The 
initiative  necessitated  the  establishment  of  several 
independent bodies to evaluate, authorize and guar-
antee projects, producing lengthy delays in the startup 
of the program. It is unclear how effective this public-
private initiative will be for fostering needed improve-
ments in agricultural infrastructure.
Effectiveness of Brazil’s Agricultural Policies. How 
effective are Brazil’s agricultural policies for achiev-
ing policy objectives? The Economist characterized 
the problems facing Brazil’s agricultural sector as fol-
lows in its 2005 Special Report on Brazilian Agricul-
ture [16, p. 73]:
Brazil’s real interest rates are the world’s highest; 
[and] its system for transporting commodities befits 
a third-world backwater, not an agricultural super-
power. 
The  study  team’s  experience  in  Brazil  suggests 
that  the  Economist’s  comments  overstate  the  credit 
problems facing Brazil’s dairy farmers. Brazil’s farm 
interest rates have declined in recent years. For exam-
ple, an agricultural banker interviewed by the study 
team said that dairy farm expansion loans for credit- 
worthy borrowers in Minas Gerais carried only a 6.75 
percent nominal interest rate in June 2008. However, 
the banker indicated that the repayment period on the 
expansion loans of five to six years is too short for 
many dairy-farm borrowers. He also added that the 
collateral for many farm loans was of limited value to 
a lender because of government restrictions on fore-
closures. Hence, the dairy farm credit picture in Minas 
Gerais, at least, is mixed, and we expect the same situ-
ation exists in other states.
Infrastructure is also more varied than depicted in 
the quote. Roads, a key component of Brazil’s infra-
structure, differ greatly in quality. Main highways in 
São Paulo and Minas Gerais—important dairy states 
in  Brazil—are  similar  to  main  roads  found  in  the 
U.S. and Western Europe. By contrast, some second-
ary roads in these states do fit the description of those 
found in a third-world backwater. 
Dr.  Gilman  Viana  Rodrigues,  State  Secretary  of 
Agriculture for Minas Gerais, gave the following pri-
ority ranking for improvements in Brazil’s agricultural 







If implemented, these priorities would help to foster 
development of Brazil’s dairy industry and increase the 
country’s ability to export dairy products. However, 
the relatively low ranking given to highway improve-
ments is noteworthy. Infrastructure improvements that 
emphasize upgrading of railroads and ports would be 
more helpful to soybean, corn and wood product inter-
ests than to the dairy industry.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) claimed that Brazil’s govern-
ment focuses an insufficient amount of resources on 
infrastructure, research and extension in a 2005 policy 
review [48, p. 1]:
. . . Brazil provides much lower support to its agri-
cultural sector than most OECD countries. How-
ever, a large and increasing share of that support 
is provided in the form of credit subsidies; support 
which could be more productively oriented to areas 
such as research and extension, training, and the 
development of rural infrastructure.
Portions of the OECD’s observations on the effec-
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tural  credit  subsidies  represent  a  form  of  industrial 
policy that involves “picking winners” to receive the 
benefit of subsidies. Picking winners is never easy and 
is undoubtedly difficult to do effectively in Brazil’s 
complex economy.
Brazilian economist, Marcos Jank, issued a more 
sweeping criticism of Brazilian agricultural policies in 
a 2006 article [41, p. 2]:
Currently, government resources dedicated to agri-
culture  are  distributed  through  over  a  hundred 
programs,  allocated  to  four  federal  ministries: 
Agriculture, Agrarian Development, Fisheries, and 
Environment.  The  curious  part,  however,  is  that 
the most serious difficulties now affecting this sec-
tor are not controlled by any of these ministries, all 
of which have become mere firefighters attempting 
to douse the flames of macro-inconsistencies that 
cause  most  of  the  harm.  These  [harmful  macro-
inconsistencies] are (a) the exchange rate volatility, 
with Brazil’s real gaining ground steadily in recent 
months against the U.S. dollar, and forcing down 
earnings for Brazilian farmers; (b) infrastructure 
bottlenecks, (c) the lack of clearly defined property 
rights and inconsistencies of the legal system; and 
(d) the lack of a more aggressive trade policy, dedi-
cated to opening up markets through regional and 
bilateral trade agreements.
A  Summary  Observation  on  Brazil’s  Agricultural 
Policies. Partly as a result of macroeconomic reforms, 
Brazil’s  real  interest  rates  have  declined  since  the 
Economist issued its Special Report. However, it is 
unclear whether the country’s transportation infrastruc-
ture for agriculture has improved substantially from 
the situations described by the Economist, the OECD 
and Jank. The property rights and legal system issues 
are probably matters that will require a long time to 
fully resolve. Trade policy issues are discussed below. 
Brazil’s Trade Policies
The partial abandonment of import substitution pol-
icies and elimination of many domestic subsidies gave 
Brazil’s  domestic  firms  strong  incentives  to  export. 
Brazilian  business-economic  analysts,  Chaddad  and 
Jank, claim that the growing international competitive-
ness of Brazil’s agrifood sectors can be attributed in 
part to the following developments [7, p. 1]:
 . . . Investments in tropical agricultural research 
and availability of agricultural credit, . . . [have] 
caused  significant  productivity  gains  since  the 
1970s. The technologies that made the expansion 
into the cerrado region in the Brazilian Central-
West—in soils that are distinctly inferior to those 
in Argentina, the U.S. Corn Belt and Southern Bra-
zil—resulted from public investments in agricultural 
research . . . Other factors also contributed to the 
competitiveness and growth of the agrifood sector 
in Brazil, such as relative stability after 1994 and 
significant  reductions  in  government  intervention 
and trade barriers.
These  developments  helped  to  transform  Brazil 
into the world’s third largest agricultural exporter in 
the mid-2000s, trailing only the U.S. and the European 
Union. Brazil also recorded a substantially larger agri-
cultural trade surplus than the U.S. in this period. 
As Brazil’s exports have grown, the composition 
of those exports has changed to emphasize soybeans, 
corn, sugar, ethanol and meats (see Figure 5 in Section 
II). However, exports of traditional tropical products 
such as coffee and orange juice have remained large. 
And, as noted earlier, Brazil became a net exporter of 
dairy products beginning in about 2004. Perhaps the 
most noteworthy change was the overall increase in 
Brazil’s agricultural and forest product exports, which 
more than doubled from 2001 to 2007.
Chaddad and Jank point out that despite favorable 
developments and the availability of labor and natu-
ral  resources,  Brazil  still  faces  significant  external 
constraints to growth of its agrifood and agricultural 
exports [7, p. 1]. Specifically, trade barriers and subsi-
dies to domestic producers and exporters—especially 
in  developed  countries—adversely  impact  Brazil’s 
agrifood exports. 
Brazil is a member of the Mercosur and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Both trade organizations 
have helped Brazil improve the country’s trading posi-
tion and lessen the impact of foreign trade barriers and 
subsidies.
Brazil  and  the  Mercosur.  Brazil  and  Argentina 
signed  12  commercial  protocols  in  1986  as  a  step The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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toward bringing the economies of the two countries 
closer together [38]. As a follow-up to the protocols 
and other agreements, Brazil and Argentina signed a 
treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development in 
1988 that set the stage for establishment of a common 
market between the two countries within 10 years. The 
agreement envisioned the gradual elimination of all 
tariff barriers between the countries and the harmoni-
zation of macroeconomic policies of both nations. It 
was also established that the common market would 
be open to all other Latin American countries. 
Uruguay and Paraguay subsequently joined Brazil 
and Argentina in a treaty that was signed by the four 
countries on March 16, 1991 in Asuncion, Paraguay to 
create a common market known as the Southern Com-
mon Market (Mercosur). Chile and Bolivia became 
associate members of the Mercosur in 1996 and 1997, 
respectively.
The objectives of the Mercosur include the follow-
ing [38]:
•  Fixing of a common external tariff and 
adopting a common trade policy with regard to 
nonmember states. 
•  Coordination of macroeconomic and other 
policies of member states relating to foreign 
trade, agriculture, industry, taxes, monetary 
system, exchange and capital, services, customs, 
transportation and communications.
•  Commitment by member states to make the 
necessary adjustments to their laws to allow for 
the strengthening of the integration process. 
Under the Mercosur, the target date for the end of 
tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers between Brazil and 
Argentina was December 31, 1994. The comparable 
date for the end of tariffs and non tariff barriers relating 
to Uruguay and Paraguay was December 31, 1995.
While the Mercosur calls for the lifting of tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers in member nations, the agreement 
allows each member nation to maintain an exception 
list for sensitive products. The exception list designa-
tion would allow tariffs (in addition to the common 
external tariff) to be applied to imports of certain prod-
ucts from Mercosur member countries. USDA-FAS 
reports  that  Brazil  designated  milk  powders,  whey 
powder and certain cheeses for the exception list under 
Mercosur  regulations  [24,  (10/18/07)].  However,  it 
is unclear whether Brazil actually applies the tariffs 
authorized under the exception list and whether the 
exception list tariffs exclude any dairy imports from 
other  Mercosur  countries.  Indeed,  Brazilian  dairy 
industry officials interviewed by the study team knew 
of no recent instances where dairy product imports 
from other Mercosur countries were impeded by tar-
iffs associated with the dairy exception list.
Brazil’s imports of UHT milk and cream, butter, 
and butteroil from Mercosur countries carried a zero 
tariff in 2007. The common external tariff applied to 
2007 imports of these products from non-Mercosur 
countries ranged from 12 to 16 percent. 
Brazil’s Foreign Trade Board conducted dumping 
investigations  which  caused  additional  tariffs  (over 
and above normally applicable tariffs) to be levied on 
imports of certain dairy products from New Zealand, 
the  European  Union  and  Uruguay  [24,  (10/18/07)]. 
These tariffs ranged from 3.9 percent to 16.9 percent. 
According to Brazilian dairy industry officials inter-
viewed by the study team, this action limited Brazil-
ian imports from these countries and helped to prevent 
Brazil’s dairy industry from being harmed by subsi-
dized foreign competitors. 
C. Phillips of Dairy Australia reported the following 
about dairy product exports of Mercosur countries in 
the mid-2000s [49, p. 4]: 
On a milk product basis, around half of Mercosur 
dairy exports consist of milk powders (mainly whole 
milk powder but also whey powders and skim milk 
powders). Food preparations account for a further 
19% of trade while cheese exports and condensed 
milk, respectively, make up 11% and 5% of total 
exports . . . From an international market perspec-
tive around 50% of the above exports are sold within 
the South American region. For example, Argentina 
and Uruguay are major suppliers of milk powders 
and cheese to Brazil . . . 
Brazil  and  the World Trade  Organization.  Brazil 
joined the WTO in 1995 when the WTO succeeded the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. By joining 
the WTO, Brazil agreed to extend market integration 
from a regional level under the Mercosur to a global 
level [4, p. 3].
Brazil—which sought expanded exporting opportu-
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ber for reasons noted in the following excerpt from   
the OECD’s review of Brazil’s agricultural policies 
[48, p. 2]:
Having  substantially  liberalized  its  own  agricul-
tural policies, the main source of future benefits to 
Brazil is reforms in other countries, where access 
to OECD country markets is the most important 
issue. Brazilian exporters are impeded by high tar-
iffs in key markets, tariff escalation according to 
the degree of processing for several important com-
modities, unfavorable treatment under trade pref-
erence schemes and tariff-rate quota systems, and 
significant  non-tariff  measures  (notably  for  live-
stock products).
Brazil undoubtedly was encouraged by measures in 
the Uruguay Round WTO Agreement, which became 
effective in 1995. These included provisions to reduce 
trade-distorting  domestic  support,  increase  market 
access,  and  reduce  export  subsidies.  For  example, 
under the market access provisions of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement, countries were required to convert 
all non-tariff barriers (quotas, import licenses, etc.) to 
tariffs and reduce the tariffs by an average of 36 per-
cent over six years, with a minimum reduction of at 
least 15 percent from 1986–88 base levels. In addition, 
countries were required to ensure that current access 
for agricultural imports was maintained and to open 
minimum access opportunities in cases where there 
was little or no trade. 
The Doha Round WTO negotiations, which began 
in 2001, were expected to open additional agricultural 
markets for Brazil and other exporters of agricultural 
products. While the Doha Round negotiations continue, 
there is little prospect for completing this negotiating 
round in the next year or two, if ever. Ironically, one 
reason for the lack of progress in the negotiations is 
that the U.S.—which expected to gain access to addi-
tional agricultural markets under the Uruguay Round 
Agreement—saw Brazil obtain much of the additional 
market access made possible by the agreement. Thus, 
many U.S. agricultural groups have opposed or pro-
vided only tepid support for the Doha Round WTO 
Agreement partly because they envision getting little 
additional market access for U.S. agricultural products 
under such an agreement. 
While Brazil is unlikely to gain additional market 
access in the near future via the Doha Round, the coun-
try may secure additional benefits through the WTO 
dispute settlement machinery. Indeed, Brazil secured 
gains under this mechanism through challenges to the 
U.S. cotton subsidy program and the EU sugar pro-
gram in 2002. The EU modified its sugar program in a 
relatively short time to eliminate objections raised by 
the Brazilians. The U.S. response to the Brazilian chal-
lenges has been more limited and slower. 
Brazil’s challenge to U.S. agricultural policy empha-
sized objections to the U.S. cotton program. Hudson, 
et al. summarized Brazil’s challenge to four compo-
nents of U.S. cotton programs and related policies as 
follows [35, p. 2]:
First, U.S. domestic support for cotton causes “seri-
ous prejudice” to Brazilian producers by depress-
ing or suppressing the world price of cotton and 
results in a larger U.S. share of the world cotton 
market. Second, U.S. export credit guarantees are 
an export subsidy. Third, the Step 2 payments are 
both an export subsidy and an import substitution 
policy. Finally, tax credits/deferrals given for cot-
ton to U.S. exporters amount to an export subsidy. 
The United States attempted to limit the scope of the 
complaint to cotton, but Brazil successfully argued 
to include all other commodities in the argument 
related to export credit programs as well.
The term “serious prejudice” appearing in the quote 
occurs when a subsidy (a) displaces or impedes exports 
or imports, (b) results in significant price undercutting, 
suppression, or lost sales, or (c) results in an increase 
in the subsidizing country’s market share.
The WTO dispute resolution panel ruled in favor of 
Brazil on most points in the challenge and an appellate 
body report mostly confirmed the initial panel’s rul-
ings. However, the WTO found that Brazil had failed 
to establish that tax credits to exporters were export 
subsidies. 
The U.S. eliminated the Step 2 program for cotton 
in August 2006 [33, p. 2]. This program had made pay-
ments to domestic cotton users and exporters based on 
the difference between U.S. and world prices. A WTO 
panel found that the program was both a prohibited 
import substitution subsidy and a prohibited export 
subsidy. The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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Brazil’s challenges to U.S. cotton programs indicate 
that the USDA’s GSM 102 (short-term export credit 
guarantees),  GSM  103  (intermediate-term  export 
credit guarantees) and the Supplier Credit Guarantee 
constitute export subsidies that are inconsistent with 
the  WTO’s  Agreement  on  Agriculture  and  Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures [53]. 
The WTO cotton dispute panel found that U.S. cot-
ton export credit guarantee programs were effectively 
export subsidies because the premiums and other out-
lays for the programs failed to cover long-run operat-
ing costs. 
The WTO’s findings regarding Brazil’s challenges 
to credit guarantee programs are potentially important 
because  U.S.  dairy  exporters  have  employed  simi-
lar programs. While the export credit programs may 
not be of much concern to U.S. dairy exporters under 
buoyant market conditions, the export credit programs 
may become important if market conditions become 
depressed and exporters seek to again use them. The 
WTO challenges make it difficult to predict whether 
export credit guarantee programs for dairy products 
and other U.S. agricultural commodities will survive 
and, if so, in what form. But it is likely that the export 
credit programs will have a short life expectancy if a 
Doha Round agreement is ever reached, since these 
programs are likely to remain targeted for elimination 
under that agreement. 
Brazil initiated a new challenge to U.S. farm pro-
grams under the WTO dispute settlement machinery in 
July 2007. The claim in the new challenge is that in 
several recent years the U.S. has exceeded the $19.1 
billion limit on trade-distorting domestic support that 
the U.S. agreed to observe under Uruguay Round’s 
Agreement on Agriculture [37]. 
Canada in November 2007 requested that a WTO 
dispute settlement panel be established to consider a 
claim against the U.S. similar to the one made by Bra-
zil. In support of its request for a dispute settlement 
panel, Canadian officials claimed that “. . . when trade-
distorting domestic support is properly accounted for 
under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the United 
States exceeded its WTO commitment in 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2004 and 2005 [32, p. 4].”
It is unclear what will come of Brazil’s latest chal-
lenge. But it is evident that Brazil will use the WTO’s 
dispute settlement machinery in attempts to achieve 
gains that are likely to slip out of reach as a result of an 
impasse in the Doha Round WTO negotiations. This 
will be a lengthy, expensive and time-consuming pro-
cess. However, Brazil will benefit from its experience 
as a litigator on such matters. 
Synopsis
Brazil’s agricultural and trade policies were instru-
mental in transforming the country into a major agri-
cultural exporter. Whether Brazil’s agricultural policies 
will  produce  substantial  increases  in  dairy  exports 
depends partly on how much the government’s credit 
subsidies foster substantial increases in milk produc-
tion and expand Brazil’s milk processing capabilities. 
A host of factors, including Brazil’s strong currency, 
poor coordination of policy programs, and infrastruc-
ture problems will limit exports of the country’s dairy 
products. 
The impasse in negotiations under the Doha Round 
of WTO negotiations will prevent Brazil from obtaining 
gains in market share similar to those secured by Bra-
zil under the Uruguay Round WTO Agreement. Brazil 
is likely to seek to open additional foreign markets for 
the  country’s  agricultural  products  through  aggres-
sive use of the WTO’s dispute settlement machinery. 
Challenges to U.S. export credit guarantees under the 
dispute settlement machinery could adversely impact 
U.S. dairy exports at a future time.
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: FUTURE OF THE BRAZIL DAIRY SECTOR
In this section, we attempt to summarize what we 
have learned about the potential for sustained future 
growth in Brazil’s dairy sector and Brazil’s potential 
for expanded dairy exports. 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities  
and Threats
As a starting point, we will use the outcome of a 
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9 SWOT analysis is a strategic planning tool initially used for assessing private business ventures, but which is now commonly applied to 
industry sectors and organizations [42].
TABLE 14. SWOT Analysis Results, UFMG Veterinary College Graduate Students, June 25, 2008
Strengths  Weaknesses
Low cost labor  Low reproductive efficiency
Low cost forage   Low productivity (low milk production per cow)
Relatively low land prices, especially in the cerrado  Sanitary problems and tropical diseases
Readily available by-product feeds  Poor labor skills and training
Indigenous dairy knowledge  Weak farm management capabilities
Very large land base  Poor infrastructure
  Weak organization of producer coops
  Lack of a supportive agricultural policy
  Low consumer purchasing power
  Corruption
Opportunities  Threats
Milk quality can be improved  Market power of dairy processors 
Income growth and related growth in consumption   Off-farm labor opportunities draw labor away from dairy
    of dairy products       farms
Strong international markets for dairy products  Strong Real hurts exports
Increased processing capacity for whey  High prices for feed, petroleum products and fertilizer
High valued crops provide capital for expanding   Inflation
     dairy farms and enhancing dairy productivity  More stringent environmental regulations
in the College of Veterinary Medicine at the Federal 
University of Minas Gerais. During the seminar, we 
engaged  students  in  a  SWOT  analysis—Strengths, 
Weaknesses,  Opportunities  and  Threats—pertaining 
to Brazilian dairying.9 Specifically, we asked students 
to identify internal strengths and weaknesses of the 
current dairy production system and external opportu-
nities for and threats to future sector growth. The stu-
dents had strong backgrounds and experience in dairy, 
some both in Brazil and in other countries, and partici-
pated enthusiastically in the process. 
The results of the SWOT analysis are summarized 
in Table 14. We have previously discussed most of the 
factors that were identified in the process, but some 
clarification and elaboration is useful. 
As strengths, participants noted relatively low costs 
for land, labor, forages and by-product feeds. These 
factors have yielded a significant competitive advan-
tage to Brazilian dairy farmers. But they have not been 
able to exploit this advantage because of historically 
low  farm  milk  prices,  something  that,  surprisingly, 
was not noted as a weakness. Indigenous dairy knowl-
edge is seen as a strength, but we earlier noted that the 
indigenous knowledge of more than a million Brazil-
ian dairy farmers is likely not compatible with modern 
dairy production practices.
Identified weaknesses included farm-level technical 
and managerial deficiencies and several broader issues. 
Weaknesses such as low reproductive efficiency, low 
milk production per cow, milk quality, disease con-
trol, poor labor skills and weak managerial capabil-
ity reflect, in our judgment, the lack of a strong dairy 
extension programs. While educational programs are 
available from several sources, they are not coordi-
nated and duplication appears to be a problem.The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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The biggest infrastructure problem would seem to be 
secondary roads servicing dairy farms, most of which 
are unimproved. From our limited observation, milk 
pickup during the rainy season must be a major chal-
lenge. The lack of reliable electrical power is another 
major infrastructure problem impeding the growth of 
dairy farms that require electricity for milking, feed 
handling and other modern dairy farm activities. 
The SWOT analysis confirmed our earlier obser-
vation that there are too many dairy cooperatives in 
Brazil and many are financially weak, poorly orga-
nized and poorly managed. We discussed the inad-
equacies of agricultural policies in a previous section. 
Participants emphasized that policies should encour-
age dairy growth by addressing price volatility, espe-
cially preventing milk prices from falling to levels that 
jeopardize the economic viability of progressive, well-
managed farms. Low purchasing power was seen as a 
weakness that is diminishing for the overall population 
of Brazil but that continues to pose a problem for a 
large percentage of the rural population. The persistent 
low incomes of a relatively large group of rural con-
sumers have also supported the informal milk sector 
and the sale of low-quality milk. Finally, participants 
also corroborated our previous observations about cor-
ruption.
The SWOT participants saw growth opportunities 
in both domestic and foreign markets. Internal income 
growth was expected to encourage domestic demand 
for dairy products and world market prices were antic-
ipated to remain strong because of supply constraints 
in major dairy countries and sustained demand growth 
in  developing  countries.  Participants  predicted  that 
recent high whey prices would induce more whey pro-
cessing capacity, adding another value-added dimen-
sion to dairy processing. 
Perhaps the most interesting dairy opportunity noted 
was the supportive nature of the Brazilian crop sector. 
We anticipated that participants would express concern 
about soybeans, sugar cane, coffee and other high-
demand crops displacing pasture land and negatively 
affecting dairy. They resoundingly rejected our sug-
gestion of that scenario, instead arguing that income 
from crop sales would promote dairy development by 
providing capital to diversified operations.
A mixed bag of threats to dairy development in Bra-
zil was identified by participants. The market power 
of processors was seen as depressing farm milk prices 
absent government intervention to promote competi-
tive prices. Perhaps reflecting their veterinary train-
ing background, participants were confident that milk 
quality could be easily enhanced. They recognized the 
strong real as a threat to expanding exports.
Participants recognized the threat of higher input 
costs resulting from wide-scale promotion of renew-
able energy and the possibility of rapid inflation reoc-
curring and diminishing consumer purchasing power. 
They also saw environmental restrictions as possibly 
constraining growth in milk production.
Future Growth in Milk Production
The  SWOT  analysis  provides  an  excellent  sum-
mary of factors that will drive dairy development in 
Brazil and, in turn, influence Brazil’s status as a dairy 
exporter. How these factors change in the future is 
very uncertain. But on net, the SWOT exercise sup-
ports our independent conclusion that there is a posi-
tive climate for continued growth in Brazilian milk 
production at rates comparable to recent experience. 
Milk production more than doubled from 1991 (14.2 
million tons) to the forecast figure for 2008 (28.9 mil-
lion tons), and year-to-year increases in milk produc-
tion since 2005 have averaged 5.5 percent. We believe 
a somewhat more constrained rate of about 4 percent 
per year may be more plausible and certainly achiev-
able absent a major deterioration in production incen-
tives. In particular, a 4 percent growth rate assumes 
that milk prices do not return to their depressed levels 
at the beginning of the decade because of a collapse in 
world dairy prices, exploitation of producers by pro-
cessors, government price controls, or other factors.
Future Growth in Consumption
A continuation of recent growth rates suggests a 
growing surplus for exporting. However, the key ques-
tion is whether Brazil’s milk supply will increase faster 
than domestic demand for dairy products. 
Rough estimates of yearly demand growth for dairy 
products in Brazil can be made by adding a popula-
tion growth figure (0.98 percent from Table 3) to the 
product of income growth and the income elasticity of 
demand for dairy products. Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3  39
The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
Real GDP growth (4.5 percent from Table 3) can 
serve as a proxy for income growth. iRIS Consulting 
quotes an income elasticity of demand of 0.39 for dairy 
products for Brazil [39, p. 112].10 Performing the arith-
metic yields an increase in demand for dairy products 
in Brazil of approximately 2.7 percent per year. This 
figure suggests that Brazil’s domestic milk production 
must increase by at least this amount before surpluses 
would be available for export. 
Increases in per capita income may alter Brazilian 
diets in favor of dairy products, possibly making our 
demand  growth  prediction  conservative.  Similarly, 
enhanced government feeding programs to improve 
nutrition could stimulate internal consumption beyond 
what  might  be  expected  based  on  population  and 
income growth. For example, Brazilian health authori-
ties estimated internal milk demand based on adher-
ence to dietary recommendations (Table 15). Resulting 
consumption  in  2007  would  be  39.3  million  liters 
compared to 26.8 million liters produced, a 47 percent 
shortfall. 
Future Growth in Dairy Exports
We projected Brazil’s exportable dairy surplus to 
2015 assuming a 4 percent annual increase in milk 
production and a 2.7 percent annual growth in inter-
nal demand. As a base for this projection, we used the 
FAS 2008 milk production forecast of 29.89 million 
tons and recent 2008 dairy trade forecasts made by 
Brazil’s National Food Supply Company (COBAB) 
[55]. COBAB forecast 2008 dairy exports at 1 million 
tons milk equivalent valued at US$750 million. Dairy 
import volume was not forecast, but import value was 
forecast at US$200 million. Using the export value/
volume ratio (0.75) as a proxy for the ratio of import 
value  to  import  volume  yields  an  import  volume 
forecast for 2008 of 267,000 tons.11 This implies net 
exports, or exportable surplus over consumption, of 
733,000 tons milk equivalent in 2008. By subtraction, 
domestic  consumption  of  28.166  million  tons  milk 
equivalent was forecast for the 2008 base year.
We  applied  the  annual  population  change  (0.98 
percent),  income  change  (4.5  percent)  and  income 
elasticity (0.39) values noted above to project inter-
nal dairy consumption in 2015 assuming these val-
ues remained constant over the 2008–15 period. This 
yields consumption (including imports) of 34 million 
tons compared to production of 38 million tons for an 
exportable surplus of 4.0 million tons in 2015.
To place this number in context, 2005 net exports 
expressed in milk equivalent for leading dairy export-
ing countries as reported by FAO are noted in Figure 
16.12 The projected 4 million tons exportable surplus 
10 This relatively low income elasticity of demand for dairy products may reflect Brazil’s meat-oriented consuming habits.
11 The different composition of Brazil’s dairy exports and imports makes this assumption admittedly tenuous. 
12 FAO is the only known source of milk equivalent dairy exports that uses a consistent methodology for converting dairy products to milk 
equivalent across countries. Unfortunately, the most recent FAO dairy trade data available are from 2005, prior to significant changes in 
world dairy markets that altered the values and rankings shown in Figure 16. Note that FAO reported net milk equivalent imports of 186,000 
tons for Brazil in 2005 compared to the base (2008) net exports of 733,000 tons. 
TABLE 15. Brazil Internal Milk Demand Based on Dietary Recommendations
  Recommended  
  Consumption  Population   Demand  
Age Range   liters/year  2007  (million liters/year)
Children (up to 10 years)  146  32,324,081  4,719
Adolescents (10–19 years)  256  36,318,893  9,298
Adults (20–69 years)  219  107,267,323  23,492
Mature (greater than 70 years)  219  8,076,994  1,769
Total    183,987,291  39,277
Source: Embrapa Dairy Cattle [19] citing Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) as original 
source. Note population is IBGE estimate for April 1, 2007 (http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/pop-
ulacao/contagem2007/contagem_final/tabela1_1.pdf).The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
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for 2015 is greater than that recorded for all but four of 
world’s top dairy exporters in 2005.
To test the sensitivity of these projections to the 
assumptions  employed,  we  generated  exportable 
surplus using a range of values for milk production 
growth, income growth, and elasticity of demand.13 
Figure 17 shows the relationship between exportable 
surplus in 2015 and the rate of growth in Brazilian 
milk production, using high, medium and low rates of 
growth in income and fixing income elasticity at 0.5.14 
With  low-income  growth,  exportable  surplus  is 
positive even if production increases at only 2.5 per-
cent annually between 2008 and 2015. But at higher 
growth rates for income, internal consumption absorbs 
more of any production gain. At a 6 percent annual rate 
of income growth, a 3.75 percent annual production 
increase is needed to prevent a dairy trade deficit. At 
the other extreme, a 3 percent annual growth in income 
and  a  6  percent  growth  in  production  would  yield 
exportable surplus of 10 million tons, placing Brazil at 
New Zealand’s level of dairy exports in 2005.
Figure  18  shows  the  effect  on  projected  2015 
exportable surplus of holding production growth con-
stant at 4 percent per year and ranging income growth 
from 3 percent to 6.5 percent at high, medium and 
low values for assumed income elasticity of demand. 
Income growth less than 4 percent per year generates 
exportable surpluses between 2.5 and 5.2 million tons. 
But high income growth combined with high income 
elasticity of demand would spell net imports of dairy 
products.
Sensitivity analysis emphasizes the critical role of 
domestic consumption in determining Brazil’s future 
status as a dairy exporter. Sustained economic growth 
would  encourage  expanded  milk  production  but,  at 
the same time, stimulate internal demand for milk and 
13 We did not alter the population growth rate from 0.98 percent on grounds that population growth is more stable and predictable than 
income growth. Other factors held constant, lower rates of population change would increase exportable surplus over those noted in our 
projections and higher rates would decrease exportable surplus.
14 This is higher than the iRIS value used in our analysis but, in our judgment, closer to what can be expected in the future based on analysis 
of income elasticity of demand for dairy products in Argentina [51].






















0                    1                    2                   3                    4                   5                    6                    7                    8                   9                  10                 11
Source: [22]. 
Million TonsBabcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3  41
The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
































Income Growth = 3% Year
Income Growth = 4.5% Year
Income Growth = 6% Year
Rate of Production Growth






















































Income Elasticity = 0.4
Income Elasticity = 0.5
Income Elasticity = 0.6
Production Growth Fixed at 4% Year
Income Elasticity Fixed at 0.5The Dairy Sector of Brazil: A Country Study
42  Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2008-3
dairy products. This leaves the effect on exportable 
surplus uncertain.
Synopsis
Sorting  through  the  internal  strengths  and  weak-
nesses of Brazil’s dairy sector and evaluating external 
opportunities and threats leads us to conclude that milk 
production will grow at the rate of about 4 percent per 
year in the near-term. How much of this added produc-
tion will be consumed internally and, as a result, how 
much Brazil will increase dairy exports is less clear. 
However, a continuation of recent consumption trends 
suggests Brazilian dairy exports in the neighborhood 
of 4 million tons milk equivalent in 2015. This would 
significant elevate its standing among leading dairy 
exporting countries.
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